THE PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE SOUTH CAROLINA

HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

1972

Contents

Officers of the Association, 1972-73

President	J. M. Lesesne, Jr., Wofford College
Vice-President	C. W. Bolen, Clemson University
Secretary-Treasurer	Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College

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(In addition to the officers named above)

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Robert M. Weir, University of South Carolina

E. T. Crowson, Winthrop College

Editor of Proceedings

Lowry P. Ware, Erskine College

The South Carolina Historical Association supplies the *Proceedings* to all its members. The Executive Committee elects the Editor. Beginning in 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years.

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ANDERSON
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
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THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING
SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

The forty-second annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association was held Saturday, April 8, 1972, at Columbia College, Columbia, South Carolina. Approximately 50 members and guests attended one or more of the programs.

Following registration in the basement of Edens Library, the first session was called to order at 9:30 a. m. in that building, Association President Ronald D. Burnside presiding. Professor Robert J. Moore, Columbia College, brought greetings from President R. Wright Spears who was out of the city. The first paper read was "Reformist and Humanitarian Criticism of British Imperialism, 1878-1882," by John V. Crangle, Allen University, which was discussed by A. O. Njoku, Benedict College. John M. Block, Furman University, then read a paper entitled "British Press and Public Reaction to Prussian Policy, 1854-1866" which was discussed by Joseph Wightman, Erskine College. The morning session adjourned at 11:45 and was followed immediately by a meeting of the Executive Committee.

Luncheon was served in Humphries Hall at 12:30 p. m., after which the annual business meeting was held. The minutes of the forty-first meeting were approved as printed in the PROCEEDINGS, and the Treasurer's report, copies of which were distributed to all members present, was adopted.

Miss Wylma Wates, for the Executive Committee, presented the following slate of officers for 1972-1973:

President: J. M. Lesesne, Jr., Wofford College
Vice President: C. W. Bolen, Clemson University
Secretary-Treasurer: Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College
Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1975): E. T. Crowson, Winthrop College

There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the slate be accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed. President Burnside announced that Dr. Ware had agreed to serve as Editor of the PROCEEDINGS for one more year but that both he and Dr. Gannaway had asked to be relieved of their duties in 1973.

A motion was made and seconded that the constitutional amendment distributed to all members at the beginning of the business meeting be approved. The amendment was that (1) the present Article VIII shall be designated Article IX, and that (2) a new Article VIII shall be inserted to read: "In the event of dissolution, the remaining assets of the Association, if any, shall be donated to another organization which also enjoys tax-exempt status under Section 501-C-3 of the Internal Revenue Code." Dr. Gannaway explained that the amendment was necessary if the Association expected its application for tax-exempt status to be approved. The motion was carried unanimously.

President Burnside announced that no decision had been made concerning the date and location of the forty-third annual meeting but that this information would be sent to members later. He then thanked Columbia College for its hospitality and commended Professor Moore for the splendid work done by his local arrangements committee.

The afternoon session, again held in Edens Library, began at 2:00 p. m. Papers read were "William Howard Taft and the Republican Party in South Carolina" by David C. Needham, Presbyterian College, discussed by Theodore Hemmingway, Benedict College; and "Olin D. Johnston and the Highway Department Controversy" by Jay Bender, St. Andrews Presbyterian College, discussed by Marvin Cann, Lander College. Audience participation was enthusiastic before the session ended at 4:15 p. m.

Preceded by a social hour in the Student Center Lounge, the Banquet Session was convened in Humphries Hall at 7:00 p. m. Following dinner, Dr. Seth Tillman, Chief Counsel for the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, read a paper on and led a lively discussion of the subject "The History of the Development of War Powers in American Government."

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 9:15 p. m.

BRITISH PRESS AND PUBLIC REACTION TO PRUSSIAN POLICY, 1854-1866

John M. Block

As Werner Eugen Mosse has pointed out in his excellent work, *The European Powers and the German Question 1848-1871*, the emergence of a strong Prussianized Germany has too often been examined in a purely Prussian light. Certainly Bismarck was the equal of any nineteenth century diplomat and made brilliant use of the opportunities available to him. Yet no individual or group of men could have transformed the weakest of the five great powers to the strongest in just a few short years if the international situation had not favored such a change.

In particular, English policy historically had been zealously aimed at preventing the growth of a disproportionately powerful force on the continent. Yet Whitehall took no steps to prevent Bismarck's reshaping of central Europe. Among a number of factors that precipitated this lack of action was the fact that the British desired a strong Germany to counter Russian "Asiatic Barbarism" and to check the dangerous "ambitions and intrigues" of Napoleon III. Throughout the dozen years following the outbreak of the Crimean War, years in which momentous changes in the European power structure were occurring, the British expressed consistent great expectations towards the events and inhabitants of central Europe. The Germans were after all primarily protestant, racially akin to the British and shortly destined to achieve liberal government — in short to become the Britain of the continent.

Considering the state of development of public organs and their impact on the government structures of the European nations of the mid-nineteenth century, it seems strange that English popular opinion has been the most neglected. While E. M. Caroll and Lynn Case have examined various phases of French and German opinion in the nineteenth century, and Oron J. Hale has dealt with both England and Germany at the turn of the century; there is next to nothing dealing with British opinion in the age of *realpolitik*, and public opinion in regard to Prussia and Germany has been completely neglected. It is the purpose of this paper to examine public opinion in Britain during the Seven Weeks War and illustrate some of the prevalent attitudes of the previous twelve years, in particular to demonstrate that British opinion was favorable to German unification and was willing to overlook the unpopular means to this desired end.

Despite a continued patient optimism, by 1866 the British were temporarily piqued by the course of events in Germany. Bismarck's high handed actions toward the Prussian Landtag and Denmark were definitely inconsistent with the British blueprint for central Europe. Not only had the Prussian's perverted their designated role in Europe, but as a result of their

arrogant behavior toward the Danes and their demonstration of British weakness had humiliated the British. Furthermore many observers feared that Prussia might be willing to "do a deal" with Napoleon III, trading the Rhineland for French neutrality in the approaching war.

While the British did not welcome this war they wished to take no active part in safeguarding the peace and expressed no inclination to take part in an international conference. Only the *Daily Telegraph* called for a conference on the frivolous grounds that after the war one would be required anyway and it might as well be held without the fighting. The memory of the failures of 1864 was too near. While most speakers and publications believed conferences and congressed were ineffectual, Granville, Lord President of the Council, felt that "the gathering together of such intriguers as the Enperor, Gortchakoff, and Bismarck" was absolutely dangerous and "in itself an evil."[1] When Austria torpedoed the proposed conference, therefore, the British were not distressed, though as Gladstone told Commons, war was inevitable.[2] His pessimism was well-grounded. On 16 June the Prussians crossed into Hanover and two days later the formal declarations of war were delivered.[3]

Fleet Street did not restrain itself from speculation about the momentous developments that could result from this war in central Europe. Most papers, however, only implied that the war would be long and would involve other powers. The Manchester *Guardian* was among a small minority of publications that openly attempted to predict the character the war would take. To choose a victor between Austria and Prussia was difficult because war "would no sooner have begun than it would draw in domestic and foreign elements, neither the power nor the direction of which can be reckoned with precision." It appeared that the well-matched German powers would engage in "a long combat with a doubtful issue," a war whose end could not be foreseen.

Hostilities were the extension of the diplomatic struggle that had been progressing since Denmark's defeat. In war as in diplomacy, the antagonists were vying for the virtual sovereignty of Germany. The *Guardian*, moreover, cautioned its readers not to be too disappointed or disapproving if the Prussians wholeheartedly supported Bismarck: "It is universal and within certain limits, it is right that populations should be for a time at least enlisted in favor of war . . ." Although the Prussians would support Bismarck for the time being, these naturally liberal people would "pretty certainly overthrow Count Bismarck's Government, together with some more august institutions at the end . . . ."[4]

The *Times* deplored the idea of civil war in Germany. How could those "well-educated, intelligent, thrifty, industrious, and enterprising" Prussians incite this war? A war between Austria and Prussia would be "something more" than a civil war. "It would be like a war between Ohio and Illinois in contempt of the supreme Government at Washington." Yet in spite of these

views and the fact that to many Prussian policy seemed suicidal, the *Times* did not characterize Bismarck's policy as totally reckless. There was "literally no sacrifice which German Liberals might not be willing to make to the vision of German unity." On the other hand, should Bismarck fail, Germany would likely be more consolidated by Austria. In either case, the resultant Germany was bound to be more practical than the present organization. "If the events should prove that the Confederation is now a thing of the past, there may be no reason to regret the change." [5]

The *Daily News* had always decried Prussian "preference for greatness over freedom." The latest developments only manifested that preference. For the last three years Prussia had shown itself to be "false and perfidious." Berlin's ultimate aim was to "overthrow the political fabric of Germany, and destroy the only institution which has represented its national unity since the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. [6]

In further contrast to the opinion that any new organization of Germany would be an improvement, the *Morning Post* felt that no good result could come of an Austro-Prussian war. Even if Prussia could succeed against Austria and several other German states, which was doubtful, and could "swallow up the German Principalities, the Rhine must go to France, unless victor and vanquished combine to oppose it." [7]

The *Spectator*, like the Manchester *Guardian*, openly predicted a non-decisive campaign between two "tolerably equal" forces. The hostilities would be "dubious, costly, and horribly murderous." The *Spectator*, however, was able to discern possible momentous and even beneficial results coming from the war, although this was by no means absolutely certain. Prussia's situation was understandable and "not entirely in the wrong." Perhaps the union of Northern Germany was worth a war, but the aggression of France was a very real danger which had to be avoided. [8]

The *Standard* could see no peace in Germany until Austria and Prussia had settled "the questions of pre-dominance in Germany." Although at first glance it seemed improbable, the war would be as popular in Prussia as the War of Liberation. The sides were about even according to the conservative paper, and success or failure might well depend upon how well Austria's financial resources survived. As the Prussians poured into Hanover, Saxony and Electoral Hesse, the *Standard* noted how advantageous their annexation to Prussia would be. [9]

The *Pall Mall Gazette* did not dissent that the stakes were high in central Europe. Prussia's supremacy in Germany was Bismarck's goal, and, whatever the results of "the terrible catastrophe now coming over Prussia and Germany," there was no doubt that to Bismarck would belong forever the credit for having instigated it. [10]

The *Economist* had pointed out during the previous year the nuisance that the petty principalities of Germany had always been to Europe. If the

Hohenzollerns could absorb these states by some great success it would not only rid Europe of a continuous source of trouble but also make the victory of liberal and constitutional government more certain by reinforcing and reinvigorating the forces of liberalism within Prussia. Now the opportunity was at hand for Prussia to make Germany great, "indeed quite equal to France."[11]

The *Saturday Review* recoiled from the thought of a war between Germans but was forced to admit that it was probable. This war would be "great in its scale, and gravely momentous in its consequences." It was a struggle for national predominance. The real opportunity was Prussia's because at best Austria could only hope to preserve things as they were, but Prussia had "a splendid prize" before it. Bismarck was not the man "to see the prize floating before his eyes and fail to grasp it . . . ."[12]

The weekly *Guardian* exemplified the bitterness and resentment that some British publications felt towards Bismarck. He had irritated and provoked the Austrians into a war which he hoped would turn national attention away from his internal transgressions. The "right and fitness of Prussia to be leader of Germany "was questionable when its people could be driven into war by a man who "only imitates great contrivers of war in selfish arrogance and cynical scorn of justice and the opinion of mankind."[13]

Other publications, like *Fortnightly Review* decried the fact that Germany was entering a "fratricidal" war, and expected a long period of suffering. Only the *Daily Telegraph* broke the pattern and fearlessly predicted a rapid conclusion to the war. Although Parliament had abstained from commenting on the coming conflagration it was not for lack of interest in "the affairs of our Teutonic kinsmen." Rather it was due to the fact that the British had nothing to fear in the growth of either Austria or Prussia. While some observers and apparently the French Government expected a war in which the combattants would exhaust each other, the *Telegraph* judged that it was "certain" the war would be bloody and ruinous but short. "We shall never have long wars again." The advanced state of human slaughter had made sustained war impossible.[14]

Initial military maneuvers were followed with interest in England, and by late June a crucial and decisive battle was expected. Prussia's initiative and success had been impressive, and its army had shown resolution, preparation and an insensibility to scruples. Austrian slowness, on the other hand, enabled its enemies to make immediate gains. Whether these gains would be permanent or not, their political impact would be great in Germany. Few were ready, however, to concede victory to Prussia, and even fewer were as certain as the *Spectator* that the work of unifying North Germany had been done for the Liberals by their erstwhile enemy. The British still expected Napoleon III to become arbiter of Europe in return for fitting compensation. Most observers, moreover, believed that Austria had a not inconsequential

advantage in the person of General Benedek, and they expected his role to be crucial. This it was, though his role as vanquished rather than victor was not commonly foreseen.[15]

No one in Britain, however, was prepared for the swiftness with which the future of Germany was decided. The news of the Prussian victory at Konnigratz on 3 July shocked the British. The Manchester *Guardian* expressed its amazement: "We have scarcely settled in our seats and concentrated our attention to see the play, before the action shows signs of exhaustion, and the end of the plot appears to be in view."[16]

It was immediately and widely accepted that the consequences of the Prussian victory would be immense. There was a complete change of attitude toward Prussia, its army and its Chief Minister. The British viewed Hohenzollern success with awe. *Macmillan's Magazine* expressed the view that whenever a new compilation of the 'Decisive Battles of the World' would be published, "Sadowa or Konnigratz will have to be added to the list." The British would also have to revise their attitude toward Germany, which they would never be able to understand unless they freed themselves from "the stereotyped impression" that the Germans were "dreamers, enthusiasts, and sentimentalists."[17]

While Bismarck was the recipient of a favorable revision of opinion, the change was no greater than that regarding the efficiency of the Prussian Army. No aspect of Prussian victory was more discussed than the army's breech-loading rifle, the needle gun, with which the entire Prussian infantry had been armed. Breech-loaders had been experimented with in one form or another for centuries, but the problem had been to construct a movable breech that could withstand the force of the explosion that propelled the shot. As early as 1835 Nikolaus von Dreyse had invented the ancestor of the rifle used at Konnigratz. By 1841 Prussia made its first order for the weapon, and it had been used in 1849 and 1864. By 1866 even *Landwehr* units were being supplied with the needle gun, but it was not until Konnigratz that its existence received widespread attention.[18]

Some British publications gave nearly sole credit for Prussian success to this weapon. The *Standard* evaluated Prussia's early movements: "In defiance of strategy, but with confidence in the needle gun, the Prussians have attacked the Austrians in their chosen stronghold." This attack convinced the *Standard* that an important weapon had appeared which would alter the future course of warfare. The needle gun had "fully established its unquestionable superiority over all other implements of war." Without disparaging the bravery of Prussian troops or the military authorities who had the good sense to adopt the new weapon, Prussia's victories were, nonetheless, primarily due to the new rifle. At Konnigratz for every three Prussian soldiers slain, at least eighteen Austrians were said to have shared their fate, "a proportion exactly equivalent to the computed length of time within which the

needle breech loader can be discharged — six times for the one the capped breech loader can be fired." It was only as an afterthought that the *Standard* acknowledged that Bismarck, "the greatest if the wickedest statesman" of the generation, and the excellent organization and administration of the Prussian army had also played their part in making Prussian dominance possible, a situation that the *Standard* viewed as a "decided gain" from the British point of view.[19]

The Prussians had boldly and skillfully planned their invasion according to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, but there was no doubt that the breech-loaders had "everywhere done the work." The *Daily News* reported the terrible effect of the rifle and repeated the claim by "a military correspondent" that "the Austrians who fell under fire of infantry were, compared to the Prussians, six to one." To the *Morning* Post it was evident "that the possession of a breech-loading gun gives the Prussians an advantage which renders all the courage and heroism of the adversaries utterly useless." It was this knowledge that had encouraged Bismarck to "brave the anger of all Germany." Without denigrating the Prussian military, the *Spectator* also acknowledged the effectiveness of Dreyse's weapon. The *Telegraph*, however, was overwhelmed. "In the moment, in the twinkling of an eye, the breech-loading needle gun . . . has rendered Prussia almost the umpire Power of Europe." With such a superb weapon, Bismarck could not only dictate terms to Austria, but also "defy the interference either of France or Russia." The Telegraph could only be grateful that Britain had not met the Prussians in combat two years before. Such an "accident" could have "pointed a moral similar to that which Austria is pointing today." *Punch* was so impressed, it offered a composition to be sung to the tune of 'The Dog Meat Man':

> Sharp shoots the Prussian Rifle, which
> Has to be loaded at the breech;
> Five times for each mouth-loader's one:
> What a formidable weapon is the needle gun!
> Oh, that unerring needle-gun!
> It does knock over men like fun.
> What a formidable weapon is the needle gun![20]

Others were somewhat more restrained. The *Examiner* reported that Dreyse, now an old man of seventy-eight, felt the gun could be improved, and that he could reduce the weight of a new model by three and a half pounds: "It has not killed and wounded enough to come to his expectations, but he hopes to do better." *Cornhill Magazine* reminded its readers that breech-loaders had always had their advocates. Admittedly the weapon possessed rapidity of fire, increased its user's confidence, was easier to load, improved shooting, avoided overloading, had compact ammunition, and was

easy to clean and inspect. Its rapidity and ease in firing, however, encouraged waste and made it difficult to keep the troops supplied.[21]

Although the *Times* called Dreyse's weapon "the dread needle gun," it denied the result of Konnigratz was due to a "merely mechanical advantage." Certainly it had added to the effectiveness of the Prussians, but "the spirit of their onset, and the skillful arrangement by which a part of their army was brought on the flank and rear of the enemy would have effectually dislodged the Austrians from their position." *Fraser's Magazine* believed the Prussians deserved credit for using a superior weapon, but credited their success to the "intellectual superiority, more accurate information, and sounder judgment of King William and Count Bismarck." The Manchester *Guardian* agreed that there was more to Prussian success than the needle gun. It had not been an unknown quantity three weeks before, having been used in Denmark. *Fortnightly Review* asked if the rifle had caused "every Prussian Corp to arrive punctually to the minute at the place to which it had been ordered by telegraph from the central office at Berlin?" Had it been the needle gun that "made the Prussian soldier, even in Bohemia, in the midst of a hostile population and far from the headquarters of its resources, far better cared for than the Austrians in their own country?"[22]

The weekly *Guardian* had been very critical of Prussian policy but now could no longer restrain itself from running over with compliments. There had been few things in history more striking than the "vigor and ability" with which the Prussian Government had waged this war. The victory, "one of the greatest in the history of the world," should give Bismarck the name he was "notoriously ambitious of" and cover his generals with glory. The *Guardian*, as did all those commenting on the war, placed great importance on the Prussian breech-loader, but refused to credit the weapon alone for the Prussian victory. The gun was a great advantage, but "in generalship, in courage, in endurance, and in national spirit, the army of Prussia is superior to that of her former rival."[23]

The *Economist* believed that the needle gun had made Prussia not only the stronger of the two belligerents but "the strongest power in Europe." Although making allowances for "the audacity of that underestimated person, Count von Bismarck, for the splendid organization of the Prussian army, for the genius of Count von Molke . . . , the result of the campaign is still mainly due to the Prussian possession of the needle gun." The advantages of the needle gun were enhanced, however, by Prussia's possession of Count Bismarck, who by exhibiting the quality necessary for greatness, "a political dreaming power with a thoroughly physical estimate of the instruments by which his dreams are to be realized," deserved to rank with Cavour and Napoleon III as one of Europe's great statesmen.[24]

The usually sober *Spectator* was no less enthralled. Thirty dynasties had been "swept away," the fate of twenty million people had been "affected

forever." The "political force of the world" had changed "as it used to change after a generation of war, and the strife has lasted but ten days." In a moment Prussia had leaped "into the position of the first Power in Europe." A year before North Germany was a prize the Prussians regarded as beyond hope, now it was an accomplished fact. Prussia had revealed to the world that "in the last resort, when Diets are powerless and diplomacy is sulkily quiet, the physical power of Prussia is equal to that of her great rival." [25]

The "audacious" Bismarck was "beyond all question the foremost man in European politics." His career, moreover, had just begun and politicians had better ascertain what his "views and capacities" really were. Certainly the popular view had been distorted and incomplete. He as no "mere squire." The *Spectator* compared him to the patricians of Rome, who had combined a "strong will, great perseverence, and the highest astuteness with a kind of jovial recklessness." And of course, unlike the Roman patricians, Bismarck had the needle gun. The *Spectator* foresaw the unification of all Germany excluding Austria, and believed it would be "the formation of a great and progressive empire, with a free and noble national life." Napoleon III would be compelled to decide if he would allow this and lose his prestige as "the arbiter of Europe" or to risk defeat and his throne in a war with Prussia.

The *Saturday Review* marvelled at Bismarck's success. When he had said he would unite Germany without Austria, it seemed impossible. "But the war has made many things seem natural that before the war seemed very unnatural." Prussia had made it clear to the *Review* that there was no Germany unless Prussia lead it. This was the "very state of things which Count Bismarck has for three years been moving heaven and earth to bring about." The intoxicated *Review* went on:

> And at the moment when the thought is running through
> the minds of men that this new Germany must come
> into existence, the companion thought also makes
> itself felt that it is an excellent thing it would
> be so, and that there is something glorious and
> noble in owning the supremacy of a nation which
> could win such a battle as that of Sadowa.[27]

The *Illustrated London News* was dazzled by Prussian success. "From first to last every scheme of the bloody drama has been a surprise . . . ." Hopefully from "midst the ruins which the triumphant blows of Prussia had strewn round" a lasting peace among the Great powers would develop. No longer did the *News* view the Prussians as the sole party responsible for the war. Austria had been persistently contentious and haughty, and the Austrian possession of Venetia could not be overlooked as a cause of its downfall. At second glance, moreover, the Prussians had not behaved so outrageously.

Although Berlin had put forth some "frivolous" pretext in preparation for the war and its tone had been "insolent and overbearing," Prussia represented "in the main a great national sentiment" and had gained the hegemony of Germany with its "ambition, energy, resoluteness, promptitude and, above all prowess in the field." If anyone could show how the defunct German Confederation had advanced even indirectly the cause of human progress, he deserved a reputation for genius. "It condemned a noble race — one of the most highly cultivated in the world, in science, art, and letters — to the pity and sometimes the derision of its neighbors . . . ." Such a situation was now a relic of the past.[28]

New Monthly Magazine also illustrated the changing view of Bismarckian Prussia. At the outbreak of the war, it complained that Europe was to "be drenched in blood through the wantonness either of the Prussian sovereign or his tool and prompter Bismarck." Following the war, however, *New Monthly Magazine* felt obligated to refrain from determining the aggressor and instead postulated the familiar idea that North Germany was a natural ally of Britain. *Fraser's Magazine* also viewed Germany's development toward unification favorably. "If ever then there would seem to have been a manifest destiny at work in the evolution of human things, we may be excused for fancying it revealed in the realization of hopes so long deferred . . . ." *Blackwood's Magazine* observed that all were ready to discuss Prussia's successful marches, "Napoleonic feats," which destroyed the Habsburg Monarchy and laid the groundwork for a new empire:

> A month ago it was believed that Prussia would find in her present humbled antagonists an overmatch; now we see her throttling Austria with one hand, and waving off France with the other. The 'armed intervention' which might have become a fact had the defeat of Konnigratz been less decisive, is reserved for further consideration, and our potent friend over the way is not master of the situation.[29]

Even *Punch* could find an appropriate place for the firmness of the Iron Chancellor:

> When a correspondent writes of perils encountered in his scamper not over American prairies, but through Hyde Park of regal fame, and dismally relates how he was hunted, robbed and maimed on that privileged plain by Anglo-Saxon savages, Mr. Punch, raising his solemn eyes to the imperturbable Woods and Forests, says, with a despairing sigh, 'Wanted, a Bismarck.'[30]

The *Daily News* saw the Prussians "advancing with a rapidity and conquering violence" which was "truly marvellous." Benedek's failure was puzzling, but to those who had observed the progress of the war, nothing was "more striking than the extraordinary promptitude of Prussian movements." The performance of the Prussian military had been extremely impressive, and its successes had "substituted Count von Bismarck for Napoleon III as the central figure in Europe." A first step had been taken toward proving the Germans would no longer be content with the sovereignty of the air. To the *News* the next and ultimate step would be the incorporation of the South German states in a united Germany.[31]

The *Post* was as confused by Benedek's lack of success as were the other papers and magazines. It was likewise greatly affected by the impact of Konnigratz, which it ranked with Waterloo as one of the decisive battles of the world. Although the *Post* doubted that the *News* was correct about Prussia swallowing all Germany, it had to admit that development was "possible and now made much more easy."[32]

The *Times* commented on Austria's failure to advance, then launched into a tirade of praise for the Prussian accomplishment. No campaign in modern history had been "more brilliant and astonishing; no victory more complete and more speedily won." Prussia had backed its words with action. The superior prowess of the victors had been conclusive. The Prussians had spirit and organization. German possibilities were now unlimited. Southern Germany, like the North might be totally absorbed by Prussia.[33]

The *Times* also saw Count Bismarck in a different light. Even before Konnigratz the *Times* had predicted that Bismarck might soon be "a demigod not only in the eyes of the Prussians, but of all patriotic Germans." He knew what everybody in Germany wanted, unity. It was "not easy to feel unmixed admiration, and still less, to feel cordial sympathy for a man of Bismarck's temper. But strange instruments are often required to work out great purposes and woe to us if we were always to reject the desirable end because we feel inclined to quarrel with the questionable means." Although the *Times* denied the charge of hero-worship, it had to admit that if "either unity or closer union was necessary for Germany, it was only to be achieved by such means as Prussia and Count Bismarck have supplied."[34]

The Manchester *Guardian* was as stunned as anyone else by the suddenness of Prussian success, but it believed that people might be ascribing too much importance to the results of the battle. Ringing the death knoll for Austria might be premature. Not until late July was the *Guardian* willing to concede that Austria was "excluded from the councils of Germany." It was then quick to add, however, that "a strong and united Germany would probably find that no neighbor viewed its accession to maturity with so little ill-will as England...."[35]

"The daring design of Count Bismarck to develop Prussia into a great

North German kingdom extending from the Baltic to the Main, may be nearer its consumation than we have supposed," said the *Daily Telegraph*. A great Teutonic empire to check French ambitions and act as barrier against the semi-barbarianism of Russia has "always been a cherished dream." The triumph of Prussia over Austria signalled "the triumph of Protestant, Liberal, and Teutonic elements in Germany over the Catholic, aristocratic, and mixed races...." Architect of this great victory was Bismarck, outside of Napoleon III the only great statesman in Europe.[36]

Members of Parliament expressed the same sentiments that had been in evidence in the press. Only Sir George Bowyer spoke with disfavor toward Prussia, accusing his countrymen of worshipping success and attributing Prussia's victories to the needle gun, not to its "military skill or valor." The ingenuity of a gun maker had been a welcome aid to Prussia's "system of utter buccaneering."[37]

Other speakers were more favorable, however, to Prussia's new position. Mr. Laing of Wick blamed the Thirty Years War, the War of Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years War on weakness and division within Germany. He expressed the view that a strong Germany would lead to a more stable Europe and was doubly glad that this new strong state would be Protestant. Mr. Horseman remarked that events had "falsified every calculation." A campaign of ten days had brought greater changes to Europe than had occurred in Europe since 1815. Horseman belittled the idea that Prussia owed its success to the needle gun: "Was it the needle gun that enabled her to overrun Saxony and penetrate the passes of Bohemia without meeting a foe? Was it the needle gun that enabled her commanders, with a smaller army to concentrate a larger force on the critical field that decided the war?" The Prussians had made it clear that the map of Europe would not be "recast at Paris."[38]

Leaders in both parties were quick to add their best wishes to the new Germany. The new Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley, could not see how a North German Empire would be to Britain "any injury, any menace, or any detriment." Gladstone went further. Germany's weakness had been a weakness to Europe and a "perpetual cause of difficulty and apprehensions." Its cultural excellence could not be disputed. Germany contained "the most numerous race in Europe; one of the most intelligent, and, perhaps, the most highly intellectual — having traditions inferior to those of no other people." The developments in central Europe could only be beneficial to the peace and well-being of Europe.[39]

There was general agreement in Britain about Germany. The Prussians had won a battle, a war, and supremacy in Germany not because of one weapon, though it had been an important attribute. They had been intelligent, disciplined and vigorous throughout the war. Bismarck's policy and Moltke's armies had met with deserved success. No one could help but be impressed by

the emergence of the strong North Germany created by Prussian energy and efficiency. Count Bismarck's image had changed radically. The foreign statesman hated in Britain had become one of the most respected.

There were few dissenting voices as the British almost unanimously rejoiced at Prussian success. When compared to the feelings of the previous few years, it might appear that British opinion had undergone a drastic and dramatic change. A careful observation reveals, however, that British satisfaction was the logical culmination of previous attitudes and quite consistent with Britain's earlier views. The Prussian people had long been singled out as energetic, industrious, intelligent and generally admirable. Moreover, the British press had consistently emphasized with some pleasure that the Prussians not only shared their Protestant faith with the British but were related to them racially. Of course the British most rejoiced because of assumed strategic benefits acruing from the new Germany. The question must be asked, however, if these assumptions were not based on the above mentioned feelings and attitudes and if they were, did they persist well into the century or even later, and how great was their influence?

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[1] Granville to Gladstone, as quoted in Edmond Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville*, I, 504-505; "The proposed Congress," *Illustrated London News*, XLVIII(May 26, 1866), 501-502; "War or Peace," *Guardian*, XXI (May 30, 1866), 564-565; Manchester *Guardian*, May 22, June 1, 6, 1866; London *Times*, May 22, 31, 1866.

[2] *Hansard's*, CLXXXIII, 1947.

[3] "The State of Europe," *Illustrated London News*, XLVIII (June 16, 1866), 573-574.

[4] Manchester *Guardian*, March 21, June 18, April 17, May 12, 1866.

[5] London *Times*, May 8, 29, June 14, 15, 1866.

[6] *Daily News*, October 25, May 1, June 15, 1866.

[7] *Morning Post*, May 7, June 15, 1866.

[8] *Spectator*, March 31, 1866, pp. 348-349, April 7, 1866, pp. 374-375.

[9] *Standard*, May 7, June 7, 18, 1866.

[10] *Pall Mall Gazette*, June 16, 1866.

[11] "The Possible Unity of Northern Germany," *Economist*, XXIII (November 4, 1865), 1332-1333; "The Dangerous Crisis in Germany," *Economist*, XXIV (April 7, 1866), 410-411; "The War," *Economist*, XXIV (June 16, 1866), 699-700.

[12] "Prussia and Austria," *Saturday Review*, XXI (March 31, 1866), 368-369; "Germany," *Saturday Review*, XXI (June 9, 1866), 75-76.

[13] "Impending War," *Guardian*, XXI (June 13, 1866), pp. 612.

[14] "Public Affairs," *Fortnightly Review*, V (May 15, 1866), p. 174; *Daily Telegraph*, April 13, May 4, 7, June 7, 1866.

[15] "The Opening of the War," *Guardian*, XXI (June 20, 1866), 636; "The War in Germany," *Illustrated London News*, XLVIII (June 23, 1866), pp. 597-598; "The War in Germany," *Saturday Review*, XXI (June 23, 1866), 736-737; *Spectator*, June 23, 1866, p. 680; *Standard*, June 20, 1866; *Morning Post*, June 29, 1866; *Daily News*, July 20, June 30, 1866; London *Times*, June 19, 21, 1866; Manchester *Guardian*, June 19, 1866; *Daily Telegraph*, June 19, 21, 1866.

[16] Manchester *Guardian*, July 6, 1866.

[17] "The New Germany," *Macmillan's Magazine*, XIV (October 1866), 480-488.

[18] Gordon A. Craig, *The Battle of Konnigratz*, Philadelphia and New York, 1964, pp. 20-21.

[19] *Standard*, July 5, 6, 20, October 24, December 27, 1866.

[20] *Pall Mall Gazette*, July 5, 1866; *Daily News*, July 5, 1866; *Spectator*, July 7, 1866, pp. 737-738; *Daily Telegraph*, July 5, 6, 21, 1866; "The Needlegun," *Punch*, LI(July 21, 1866), p. 31.

[21] "The Inventor of the Needle-Gun," from *The Examiner* of September 8, 1866, *Littells Living Age*, LXLI (October 13, 1866), 126-127; "Breechloader," *Cornhill Magazine*, XIV (September 1866), 342-357.

[22] London *Times*, July 5, 10, 1866; "The War in Its Political and Military Bearings," *Fraser's Magazine*, LXXIV (August 1866), 259-276; Manchester *Guardian*, July 4, 7, 1866; "Public Affairs," *Fortnightly Review*, V (July 15, 1866), 627.

[23] "The Week," *Guardian*, XXI (July 11, 1866), 709; "The Battle of Sadowa," *Guardian*, XXI (July 11, 1866), 716-717; "The Prospects of the War," *Guardian*, XXI (July 18, 1866), 748-749; "The War," *Guardian*, XXI (August 1, 1866), 797.

[24] "The War and the Peace," *Economist*, XXIV (July 7, 1866), 790-791; "Count Bismarck," *Economist*, XXIV (July 21, 1866), 848-849.

[25] *Spectator*, July 7, 1866, pp. 737-738.

[26] *Ibid.*, July 7, 1866, 745-746, July 14, 1866, pp. 764-765.

[27] "The Policy of Prussia," *Saturday Review*, XXII (July 21, 1866), 63-64.

[28] "The Logical Results of the Battle of Sadowa," *Illustrated London News*, XLIX (July 14, 1866), 25-26; "The Late Germanic Confederation," *Illustrated London News*, XLIX (July 21, 1866), 50.

[29] "The Germanic Crisis," *New Monthly Magazine*, CXXVII (July 1866), pp. 322-332; "France and Prussia," *New Monthly Magazine*, CXLI (September 1867), pp. 1-2; "The Prusso-Austrian War," *New Monthly Magazine*, CXXXIX (April 1867), pp. 379-396; "The Reconstruction of Germany," *Fraser's Magazine*, LXXIV (September 1866), pp. 366-384; "A Review of the Continental War," *Blackwood's Magazine*, C (August 1866), pp. 247-260.

[30] "Wanted, A Bismarck," *Punch*, LI (August 25, 1866), 82.

[31] *Daily News*, July 5, December 31, 1866.

[32] *Morning Post*, July 5, 6, August 4, 1866.

[33] London *Times*, July 6, 10, 11, 18, 19, 23, 1866.

[34] London *Times*, July 3, 28, August 16, 20, September 4, 1866.

[35] Manchester *Guardian*, July 6, 7, 14, 17, 28, 1866.

[36] *Daily Telegraph*, July 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 1866.

[37] *Hansard's*, CLXXXIV, 1235-1241.

[38] *Ibid.*, 1223-1228; 1228-1233.

[39] *Ibid.*, 1241-1257.

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA

David C. Needham

For nearly a century the Republican party has attempted to break into the Solid South and recapture the position of strength it held there during Reconstruction. Such efforts have always fallen short of the expectation. Although many factors help to explain this failure, one of the most persistent and perplexing questions for Republicans has been the place of the Negro in our society, and within the party itself. In the post-Reconstruction period, Republican leaders knew they must cut into some area of Democratic strength or remain a sectional, minority party. The most obvious and most tempting Democratic stronghold was the Solid South. G. O. P. spokesmen advocated two divergent approaches toward the white South and the Negro. On the one hand, there were those who wished to reinvigorate the Reconstruction alliance between the "Black and Tans" (southern organizations of bi-racial composition) and the national party. Such a course necessitated the active intervention of the federal government to protect the political rights of blacks in the South. On the other hand, others proposed to abandon the Negro and actively encourage the development of a "Lily White" Republican party in the southern states. This would, so the argument ran, bring about a coalition of the "best people" of both sections — a reemergence of the old Whig alliance of pre-Civil War days. This development would be consummated by offering patronage, internal improvements, subsidies and tariff protection to southern interests and politicians.[1]

Late nineteenth-century Republican presidents adopted, at one time or another, both of these approaches, The frustrating of these efforts by Bourbon Democrats caused G. O. P. leaders to return to the traditional policies of sectionalism and the "Bloody Shirt." The last attempt for many decades to aid the Negro politically was undertaken by the Harrison administration. This was the Force Bill, introduced by Henry Cabot Lodge, which sought federal regulation and certification of state and local elections. The death of this measure at the hands of the Senate accurately reflected a public climate grown cold toward Negro civil rights.[2] Between the years 1890 and 1910, the nation acquiesced in the segregation and disfranchisement of the Negro in the South. The Supreme Court provided its legal imprimatur to "Jim Crow," most notably in the *Plessy v. Ferguson* case in 1896. "Jim Crow" had a wider experience than just the South, however, as the activities of the federal government and some northern states and communities indicated.[3]

A new departure in the Republican party's relations witth the white South and the Negro was implemented during the Progressive Era. Ironically, this reform period coincided with one of the high points of racism in American history. The resulting disfranchisement of blacks and the drawing of the color

line offered yet another opportunity for resurrecting a strong, white Republican party in the South. In addition, many southern political reformers believed that the end of "Negro domination" meant that the South could now afford a vigorous two-party system. This argument was particularly appealing to conservative Gold Democrats in the South who were unhappy with the control of their party by the Bryan element. Also lending its strength to this new impetus toward Republicanism in the South was the significant growth of southern industry, and an accompanying upsurge of protectionist sentiment there. It was with this hopeful setting in mind that Republican strategists renewed their efforts to break the Solid South.[4] And it is against this backdrop that this paper will attempt to discuss William Howard Taft's relations with the Republican party in South Carolina.

After his election in 1908, President-elect Taft addressed a "possum, 'taters, and Simmon beer" banquet in Atlanta, Georgia. In this speech Taft outlined his forthcoming "Southern Policy." He realistically told the Atlanta audience that he did not expect a political revolution in the South, because southerners were "conservative and they do not change in a mercurial way." He continued by recognizing that the expression of an administration "takes its color" in the character of federal officials appointed. He assured them that he would "spare no effort" to find out the facts in respect to the character of the proposed appointees. Furthermore, he promised to select only those whose "character, reputation and standing in the community" commend them to their fellow citizens. Only in this way, he concluded, could the "sense of alienism" be ended between the South and appointed federal officials.[5]

The Inaugural Address offered the new president an excellent opportunity to synthesize and elaborate upon his past statements about the South and the Negro. Taft said he saw his chief purpose not in effecting a change in the southern electoral vote, but in increasing tolerance and respectable political opposition in the South. Considerations on this point, he noted, could not be complete without reference to the Negro race. President Taft stated that recognition of distinguished Negro men was just and should be pursued "when suitable occasion offers." On the other hand, he continued:

> . . . it may well admit of doubt whether . . . an appointment of one of their number to a local office in a community in which the race feeling is so widespread and acute as to interfere with . . . the local government business . . . is of sufficient benefit . . . to outweigh the recurrence and increase of race feeling which such an appointment is likely to engender.[6]

Taft cautioned, however, against the manufacture of race prejudice in the interest of individual political preferment.

President Taft continued by viewing as a failure the movement of northern friends of the Negro to aid him through the protection of the suffrage "against the prevailing sentiment of the South." He said what remained was

the Fifteenth Amendment, with qualifications by the states which squared with that amendment. Once this was accomplished, it was not within the province of the federal government to, as Taft put it, "interfere with the regulation by Southern states of their domestic affairs." He maintained that this was now being fairly accomplished by most southern legislatures, and the danger of control by ", an ignorant electorate had therefore passed." As a result, he continued, there was an increased interest by southern whites in the welfare of the Negro. Taft concluded, however, that blacks must still base their major hope on "their own industry, self-restraint, thrift and business success...." [7]

Even before his inauguration, Taft gave indications that he would abide by his "Southern Policy." A clear-cut opportunity was provided by the reemergence of a longstanding feud between William D. Crum and the city of Charleston, South Carolina. Crum, a Negro physician, was nominated by Theodore Roosevelt in December, 1902, for the post of Collector of Customs at Charleston. Southern opposition led by Senator Benjamin Tillman staved off confirmation by the Senate until January, 1905. In the interim, Roosevelt provided Crum with recess appointments. The struggle grew into a *cause celebre*, which, although it helped insure Roosevelt's nomination in 1904, was sharply questioned by southern public opinion and many northern journals.[8]

In December, 1908, the struggle was renewed when Roosevelt sent the black physician's name to the Senate for renomination. The reaction of Charleston and the South was, in large part, expressed by a resolution of the South Carolina legislature, which read:

> In the all wise plan of the Creator of the universe, the white race has been made the superior of all others and to it is committed the problems and destiny of this great republic. We consider it (Crum's appointment) unfortunate, one tended to indulge the hope of social equality in the hearts and minds of the negroes of our Country and a useless and needless affront to the white citizenship of Charleston. [9]

A filibuster led by Senator Tillman successfully blocked the Negro collector's confirmation in February, 1909. The next step would be up to the incoming president.

In the meantime, the object of all this acrimony had anxiously been following the fight for his renomination in Washington, and the utterances of Taft in the South. Writing to Whitefield McKinlay, a member of the Tuskegee machine, Dr. Crum asked what he thought of Taft's "very significant remark...in his speech at Atlanta, Ga." He added that he was "somewhat afraid of Taft."[10] Early in February, 1909, Crum asked McKinlay where he stood in his fight for confirmation. McKinlay reluctantly informed his fellow South Carolinian that he was "in the soup."[11] Reacting to the news

of his failure to be confirmed, Crum thanked his ally for his efforts and contrasted it to the lack of interest by many other blacks. He added that his fight, if completely lost, would crush Negro hopes and aspirations for years. He concluded with the query, "What am I to do? Some say compromise, others say stick, what do you advise?"[12] The answer came shortly and would be bitterly disappointing to Crum.

Whitefield McKinlay was also in close contact with his mentor, Booker T. Washington. Informing the Negro educator of Crum's defeat, McKinlay stated that, "the jig is up & it has depressed me very much as it is a fight we cannot afford to lose."[13] Washington responded with sorrow at the news, but added that Crum could not complain that his friends had not stood by him. He also revealed his fear that Taft "might feel if he (Crum) could not be confirmed by the Senate at one time, he could not be confirmed at another time." Leveling some of the blame on Crum, Washington added that other Negro appointees from the South were usually able to get strong backing from white neighbors despite newspaper and political talk. Crum, he concluded, "does not seem to know how to get such influence."[14]

President-elect Taft's position on the Crum controversy had been defined in his Atlanta speech, portions of which had clearly been motivated by the situation. Late in February, Taft apparently contacted Booker T. Washington and asked him to induce Crum to resign voluntarily. The Negro educator complied and later informed Taft that Crum would resign with "good spirits." Theodore Roosevelt, who obviously approved, indicated his delight at "Booker Washington's attitude and what he says Crum will do. That is first-rate."[15] Dr. Crum resigned on February 27, 1909, to take effect with the change of administration. A week after taking office, Taft sent to the Senate the name of Edward W. Durant, Jr. to replace the Negro physician. Durant was white, an Independent Democrat, northern-born and a Yale graduate. He was quickly confirmed by the Senate.[16]

During the first half of his administration, President Taft's "Southern Policy" was most clearly discernable in the removal of blacks from federal offices in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. But the pattern was also evident in South Carolina. In July, 1909, Joshua Wilson, a black man, was ousted as Postmaster at Florence, reportedly because of white opposition. Taft requested advice on a replacement from the editor of the *Charleston News and Courier*, "Deacon" James Calvin Hemphill, and an Independent Democratic adviser, George A. Gordon of Savannah, Georgia, However, neither of their candidates was selected. Instead, Lewis J. Kuker replaced Wilson and it was charged that he was a "Lily White" supporter.[17] Other blacks reported losing their positions in South Carolina were Julius Durant, the Postmaster at Paxville; Deputy Revenue Collector Robert E. Williams of Newberry; and James A. Brier, Revenue Inspector at Greenville. The only Negro still holding office after this purge was Robert Smalls, Collector of Customs at Beaufort.[18]

In the wake of these removals, William T. Andrews, a "Black and Tan" leader and editor of the *Sumter Defender*, wrote Whitefield McKinlay asking "whether the attitude of the President is such toward the appointment of our folks down here that it would be really effort vainly spent trying to secure recognition."[19]

The "Black and Tan" organization in South Carolina was led by a Negro state chairman, Edmund H. Deas. The "Duke of Darlington," as he was nicknamed, had firm support from William T. Andrews and other black republicans, as well as tenuous backing from white federal officeholders. The off-again, on-again "Lily White" organization was headed by John G. Capers, national committeeman from South Carolina. A native of Charleston and son of an Episcopal bishop, Capers had been recruited from the ranks of the "Commercial Democrats" during the Roosevelt administration. His lieutenants were Loomis W. C. Blalock, a textile manufacturer from Laurens County, and Dan H. Wallace, an ex-Democrat whose father was still a leading voice in state Democratic circles.[20]

Late in September, 1910, the "Black and Tan" faction, angered at the ousting of blacks from office, called a meeting of the state convention to select a new executive committee. This convention was composed of more than sixty blacks and fewer than ten whites. Though boycotted by the Capers-Blalock faction, the convention unexpectedly ousted Deas from his post, reportedly on instructions from Washington, and replaced him with Joseph W. Tolbert, a white man from Greenwood. However, Deas was allowed to make a ringing speech charging Taft with drawing the color line in his South Carolina appointments. This speech, one newspaper reported, accurately reflected the sentiment of Negro delegates against the President's "Southern Policy." This same source indicated that the "Lily Whites" planned to hold a convention of their own the following month at which Negroes would not be welcome.[21]

Early in October, 1910, John Capers made a visit to the White House for an audience with Taft. Upon emerging, Capers issued a call for white Republicans and dissatisfied Democrats to meet for a convention later that month. In a letter to over one hundred supporters, he said the administration thought "the time was ripe" to launch a "respectable" opposition party in their state.[22] Concurrently, William T. Andrews reported to Whitefield McKinlay that the "LilyWhites" were boasting of plans for running "respectable candidates" for Congress. He said his faction intended to retaliate by running Negro candidates to see just who had the Republican votes in South Carolina. He asked for help from Tuskegee "to save the only Republican organization in ... which the Negro has a controlling voice." The black editor vowed to "leave no stone unturned to expose Capers and send him to the rear for life."[23] The initial attitude of the President toward this struggle was shown in his correspondence with Capers. Taft said he was "very glad to know that you are doing in South Carolina what has been done in

North Carolina and Tennessee. You have my best wishes."[24]

An article in the *Washington Star* a few days later suggested that the President, upon advice from Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock, had withdrawn his endorsement of the "Lily White" convention. It stated that the convention, "coming ahead of the elections, had begun to stir the negro voters...." It was also reported that a prominent federal official in South Carolina had told Hitchcock that "it would never do to let Capers put on foot a pure white Republican party." After another meeting with Taft, Capers announced that the convention would still be held, but without the presence of office-holders or the President's endorsement.[25]

On October 27, 1910, the "Lily White" convention was called to order. There were 113 white delegates in attendance, none of whom were office-holders. In his keynote address, Capers told his audience that the Negro "was not made nor fit for political equalization with you and me." He maintained that his organization was the beginning of "the emancipation of political thought and action in South Carolina...." Capers also charged that northern and western Republicans had kept their white southern brothers too long in political bondage to the Negro. In order to keep black Republican support, he continued, Negroes should be appointed to office in the North rather than "Africanizing the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast" states. The convention duly elected Loomis Blalock as state chairman, established executive committees for the seven districts, and wrote a platform which endorsed the Taft administration. However, Capers' faction turned down Andrews' challenge by refusing to run candidates for Congress until 1912.[26]

During the remainder of his term of office, President Taft continued, with only few exceptions, his southern appointment policy. He reiterated his belief that this policy was intended to reduce race friction, and to improve the quality and efficiency of government service. On the other hand, Taft did appoint some Negroes to important offices outside the South, including the posting, in 1910, of William D. Crum to the ambassadorial position in Liberia. Nevertheless, Negro "radicals" like W. E. B. Du Bois and some Tuskegee allies charged that the "Southern Policy," or at least its implementation at lower levels, was racially motivated.[27] However, challenges to Taft's renomination by 1911 caused a subtle shift in the administration's position. This shift may also have come from a reassessment of the relative strengths of the factions within certain of the southern Republican parties. These political changes dictated at least a toning down of Taft's "Southern Policy." In any case, it should be noted that after a decade of purging there were very few black men left to replace in the South.

The patronage power and influence of Postmaster General Hitchcock were very obviously used to rescue the "Black and Tan" faction in South Carolina. In November, 1910, a manifesto from Capers to his "Lily White" followers indicated this danger. He asked his supporters not to be alarmed if

some of those "higher up," who claimed to represent the President, were now organizing the officeholders for the purpose of controlling the delegation to the next convention. He insisted that such an organization would have to join the "regular party with us; go to Joe (Tolbert) and his sixty-six colored boys or stand out in direct opposition to the known and expressed sentiments of the President ...."[28]

Capers' optimism must have been shaken by subsequent patronage defeats. In December, 1910, a long contested position went to Laurens G. Young, who was confirmed that month as Postmaster at Union. It was reported that Capers had backed Dan Wallace for the post. Also that month, Frederick Minshall was approved as Postmaster at Abbeville, ousting the "Lily White" incumbant. Both of the appointees, however, were white men. Early in January, 1911, the *News and Courier* suggested that efforts would be made by Hitchcock to have the "Black and Tan" faction declared the regular organization. This paper also reported that an early convention would be held by this faction to voice its support for Taft's renomination. Concern by the "Lily Whites" over these developments was indicated by a conference that month between Blalock and the Postmaster General. The "Lily White" state chairman later admitted that no agreement was reached on future appointments, nor on the faction which was to control the delegation to the 1912 convention.[29]

Traditional historical accounts of the Taft administration have made much of the President's political ineptitude and vacillating manner. Many of these accounts have also maintained that he did not mount a renomination effort until after his hand was forced by Robert La Follette and Theodore Roosevelt. A more recent interpretation takes exception with this view, and states that sometime in 1911 a "hardened" President made the decision to seek renomination. A key figure in the renomination effort was Charles Dewey Hilles, an Old Guard supporter and an able though neophyte Ohio politician, whom Taft selected as his third personal secretary, and, subsequently, as his campaign manager.[30]

As early as June, 1911, Hilles made an assessment for Taft of the party situation in the South and other regions. He reported a sizable number of southern and western members of the national committee at odds with the administration, including John Capers of South Carolina. However, Hilles assured Taft that he had already been in touch with twenty-two of the national committeemen, and they had expressed loyalty to the President. He added at least as many more would "do the bidding of the President's friends."[31]

In December, the accuracy of Hilles' assessment was indicated in the outcome of the Republican National Committee meeting. The administration forces, by a vote of forty-four to seven, routed the supporters of Roosevelt on every issue, including an effort to extend the primary device. The *New York Times* also wryly reported that Taft, in his earlier days of optimism

concerning a "new Republicanism in the South," had suggested the pruning of southern delegations. But, it added, "the exigencies of politics had led him to realize that it would be unwise to cut off delegates that are notorious for their unwavering support of the administration." [32]

Even before the national committee meeting, Hilles wrote to Republican state leaders whom he considered loyal to Taft for their evaluations of local conditions. As a result of these communications, and White House conferences, Hilles developed a plan to effect the renomination of the President. One of the main strategems was the early selection of delegates committed to Taft before his opponents could get organized and begin active canvassing. In January, 1912, therefore, he wrote Taft managers in the South, and elsewhere, to hold district and state conventions as early as possible. Acting on his advice, eight of the twelve southern organizations issued calls for their conventions in February and March, while two others called theirs to meet early in April. [33]

In the course of the pre-convention campaign it became apparent that Hilles had chosen to enlist the support of "Black and Tan" elements in certain southern states, most notably Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina. As a result, Hilles threw his support to a group of federal officeholders who were authorized to direct the renomination effort in South Carolina. In addition, the Postmaster General admitted that a controversy between two claimants for the state chairmanship had caused his department to depart from standard patronage practices. He said that the administration was temporarily consulting Wilmot L. Harris, Postmaster at Charleston, on appointments.[34]

In November, 1911, a state newspaper reported that both factions would likely send a full quota of eighteen delegates to the national convention, thus precipitating a contest over seating. The same source predicted that the "Lily Whites" would support Taft, while the "Black and Tans" would look elsewhere. However, it added that a strong effort would be made by officeholders "to whip the negroes into line for the President." The officials listed as "black herders" were J. Duncan Adams, U. S. Marshall; U. S. Attorney Ernest F. Cochran; and Postmaster Wilmot L. Harris.[35]That same month, Capers wrote Hilles that the officeholders selected by Taft's advisers could not control the "Black and Tan" convention, "composed ... of about 115 negroes and 10 white men ... (nor) *instruct* its delegates." He added that it seemed time that Taft's "real friends" were placed on guard. [36]

In mid-February, 1912, J. Duncan Adams wrote Hilles that he was having trouble keeping peace among the blacks. He stated that T. L. Grant, a Charleston Negro, was loyal but had antagonized other members of his race in his fight for a delegate-at-large post. However, he cautiously assured Hilles that "if I am able to manage them there will be eighteen delegates for the President ... that will stick to the last, win or lose." Shortly thereafter, Adams sent Hilles an article in a state paper inspired by Capers, which criticized the

"Black and Tans" for their lopsided Negro representation. Adams did not deny the statement, but laid the responsibility for the condition on Capers. He said that under Capers' leadership the state chairman had always been black, and that the delegation to the last convention had been composed of twelve Negroes and six whites. He concluded that, "unless our plans fail this time, we will have an equal number, nine whites and nine colored men ...." [37]

The same month, Hilles received a letter from the "Lily White" leader. Capers said he was informed that "Postmaster Harris, Tolbert and others of that crew were in the city (Washington) and I am forced to conclude that the administration prefers their organization as a means of endorsement." He charged that twenty-two of the twenty-five members of the state committee, six of the seven district chairmen, and forty-two out of forty-three county chairmen of the opposition organization were Negroes. Capers closed by saying his faction was called "Lily White" because it protested against the organization in the state being all black. [38]

Late in February, Taft's managers wrote of their concern over the effect Roosevelt's candidacy would have on their convention later that month. Adams asked the administration to send a good Negro speaker who could "give a rousing speech" in aid of their efforts. Hilles suggested the name of a prominent Atlanta politician, Henry Lincoln Johnson, as a visiting black fireman — and the offer was accepted with alacrity. After the convention adjourned, Adams wrote of a "grand victory" for Taft. "I heartily thank you for sending that good fellow ... Johnson;" he continued, "He with Maj. J. H. Fordham of Orangeburg, S. C., one of our old and tried wheelhorses, saved the day on resolutions and instructions." Cochran wrote that the test fight over resolutions endorsing Taft was sharp but won with a large majority. He also praised Johnson as a man who was "of considerable service to us in various ways." [39]

By mid-March, the South Carolina managers could report that the district conventions had met and lined up solidly for Taft. The problem now, they suggested, was to keep the delegates in the fold. Shortly thereafter, Hilles wrote Adams that his attention had been called to a South Carolina delegate, William T. Andrews, visiting Roosevelt headquarters in Washington. Somewhat apologetically, Adams replied that Andrews, who was instructed for Taft, was doing all he could to line up delegates for Roosevelt. He added that there were several other delegates he could not vouch for "if conditions should develop that might justify an even break for them to land on the side of the winner." [40]

Several reports to Hilles from South Carolina also indicated that the "Lily Whites" were having a difficult time trying to get enough delegates to their state convention. Patronage reverses and loss of support had obviously taken its toll. In May, Ernest Cochran wrote that the opposition seemed anxious to rally to Roosevelt, but "seem afraid" to take sides. Nevertheless,

the "Lily White" convention met and endorsed Roosevelt, but were only able to contest two Taft delegate seats at the convention, both unsuccessfully. In a final pre-convention summary, Adams told Hilles that there was not the slightest hope of Roosevelt getting more than four or five votes from the Taft delegation. He added that he had cautioned John Capers against "attempting to buy any of my delegation with the enormous corruption fund said to be behind the Colonel ...."[41]

The early organization of Taft delegates by Hilles, particularly in the South, paid dividends at the Republican National Convention in 1912. Nor was this advantage offset by the repeated preferential primary losses by President Taft to Theodore Roosevelt, his major challenger for the nomination. In spite of a few defections, delegates from the southern states, both white and black, provided the bulk of the narrow majority which renominated Taft. In the final balloting, 223 southern delegates voted for Taft while forty-five either abstained or voted for Roosevelt. Negro delegates voted fifty-four to eight in favor of the President, including six of the nine from South Carolina.[42] In the final analysis, Roosevelt was hoisted on his own petard. The "steamroller" methods and organizational tactics he had initiated in his renomination fight in 1904, and perfected in the nomination of Taft in 1908, were used against him with telling effect in 1912.

William Howard Taft, like many of his Republican predecessors, began his administration with the hope of strengthening his party in the South. He made numerous visits to the South, including his precedent-breaking campaign tour in 1908, in which he appealed to the customs, sentimentality, and interests of that section. Like many northerners, Taft accepted or acquiesed in the subtler forms of discrimination and disfranchisement practiced against black Americans. "Jim Crow" also flourished in the Washington bureaus and offices during his term, a dismal record superceded only by the Wilson administration. Taft indicated a paternalistic attitude toward Negroes which was, in part, a legacy of his experiences as Governor-General of the Philippines. It can be said that Taft was very much a product, and a mirror, of his times.

Taft also instituted a policy regarding Negro appointments which undoubtedly gratified much of the white South. While this policy did not vary too greatly from that used by previous G. O. P. administrations, including that of Theodore Roosevelt, the extent of black removals and the official sanction given it must be considered unique. When Taft assumed office there were literally hundreds of federal posts in the South filled by Negroes. By the end of his administration there were six blacks still holding presidential offices (one of these in South Carolina), and they disappeared during the Wilson administration. The slamming of the "door of hope" symbolized for black Americans a total abandonment by one of the few remaining institutions presumably friendly to his interests. Moreover, the appointment of a few

Negroes to posts outside the South did not offset the impact this policy had on southern black Republicans.

It may well be, as some have suggested, that the Republican party in the South may emerge in strength under a policy which minimizes the role of the Negro, and, instead, maximizes other economic and political issues. Such recent developments as Richard Nixon's election strength in the South in 1968 may signal the success of this approach. However, there are still forces at work today in the southern Republican party which give one pause. The Republican party, as a black newspaper suggested to Taft, must remain committed to the defense of human rights as well as property rights.

[1] Stanley P. Hirshson, *Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877-1893*, Bloomington, 1962, pp. 9-10. See also Vincent P. De Santis, *Republicans Face the Southern Question, 1877-1897* Baltimore, 1959, pp. 66-262.

[2] Hirshson, *Farewell to the Bloody Shirt*, pp. 11ff.

[3] C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, New York, 1966, pp. 67-109.

[4] C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913*, Baton Rouge, 1951, pp. 460-62.

[5] William H. Taft, "The Winning of the South," *Political Issues and Outlooks*, New York, 1909, pp. 230-39.

[6] U. S., *Congressional Record*, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 4-5.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Willard B. Gatewood, "William D. Crum: A Negro in Politics," *Journal of Negro History*, LIII (October, 1968), 301-17.

[9] Cited in *Birmingham News*, February 4, 1909.

[10] William D. Crum to Whitefield McKinlay, January 16, 1909. Carter Woodson Papers, Library of Congress.

[11] W. McKinlay to W. D. Crum, February 11, 1909. Woodson Papers.

[12] W. D. Crum to W. McKinlay, February 12, 1909. Woodson Papers.

[13] W. McKinlay to Booker T. Washington, February 7, 1909. Booker T. Washington Papers, Library of Congress.

[14] B. T. Washington to W. McKinlay, February 9, 1909. Washington Papers.

[15] B. T. Washington to William H. Taft, February 28, 1909; and Theodore Roosevelt to W. H. Taft, February 26, 1909, in Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, VI, 1538.

[16] W. H. Taft to Franklin MacVeagh, March 12, 1909. William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

[17] *Atlanta Constitution*, January 10, 1909. W. H. Taft to George A. Gordon, May 14, 1909; W. H. Taft to James C. Hemphill, June 25, 1909. Taft Papers.

[18] Fred E. Moore to Charles D. Norton, September 30, 1910. *Ibid.*

[19] William T. Andrews to W. McKinlay, May 12, 1909. Woodson Papers.

[20] *Atlanta Independent*, October 8, 1910; and *Spartanburg Herald*, November 4, 1911. The latter a clipping found in the Taft Papers.

[21] *Charleston News and Courier*, September 27, 1910.

[22] This was the first serious effort to launch such a movement since Senator John L. McLaurin's "Commercial Democracy" effort in 1900-1901 — in which Capers was also involved. See Gatewood, pp. 307-08.

[23] W. T. Andrews to W. McKinlay, October 4, and 11, 1910. Woodson Papers.
[24] W. H. Taft to John G. Capers, October 19, 1910. Taft Papers.
[25] *Washington Star* article cited in *Charleston News and Courier*, October 25, 1910.
[26] *Ibid*, October 28, 1910.
[27] W. E. B. Du Bois to Osward G. Villard, September 26, 1910. Taft Papers. B. T. Washington to Charles Anderson, November 9, 1910; and C. Anderson to B. T. Washington, November 11, 1910. Washington Papers.
[28] *Charleston News and Courier*, November 25, 1910.
[29] *Ibid*, December 2, 1910, and January 3, 20, 1911. U. S., *Congressional Record*, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1910, XLVI, 253, 400.
[30] Norman M. Wilensky, *Conservatives in the Progressive Era: The Taft Republicans of 1912*, Gainesville, Fla., 1965, pp. 12-23. See also Wilensky, "The Charles Dewey Hilles Papers," *Yale University Library Gazette*, XXXVI (July, 1961), 7-8.
[31] Memorandum of Charles D. Hilles, June 25, 1911. Taft Papers.
[32] *The New York Times*, December 10, 13, 1911; and *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, December 13, 1911.
[33] Wilensky, pp. 23-24.
[34] Frank H. Hitchcock to William A. Ashbrook, June 12, and 14, 1912. Taft Papers. The standard patronage practice was to consult state "referees," usually the state chairman and national committeeman, where there were no Republican congressmen.
[35] Clipping from *Spartanburg Herald*, November 4, 1911. Taft Papers.
[36] John G. Capers to Charles D. Hilles, November 7, 1911. Taft Papers. Italics by Capers.
[37] J. Duncan Adams to C. D. Hilles, February 14, and 16, 1912. Charles Dewey Hilles Papers, Yale University Library.
[38] J. G. Capers to C. D. Hilles, February 19, 1912. Taft Papers.
[39] J. D. Adams to C. D. Hilles, March 1, 1912; and Ernest F. Cochran to C. D. Hilles, March 1, 1912. Hilles Papers. See also *Charleston News and Courier*, March 1, 1912.
[40] E. F. Cochran to C. D. Hilles, March 13, 1912; C. D. Hilles to J. D. Adams, April 2, 1912; and J. D. Adams to C. D. Hilles, April 8, 1912. Hilles Papers.
[41] E. F. Cochran to C. D. Hilles, April 15, and May 2, 1912; and J. D. Adams to C. D. Hilles, June 1, 1912. Hilles Papers.
[42] *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Fifteenth Republican National Convention* (New York, 1912), 402-03.

REFORMIST AND HUMANITARIAN CRITICISM OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM, 1878-1882.

John V. Crangle

The late nineteenth century was a time of increasing humanitarian activity in Britain. Upper and middle class reformers and humanitarians realized that the industrialization of Britain had created many new problems while aggravating some old ones. The masses of the United Kingdom were the victims of exploitation, poverty, disease, and neglect. Many reformers blamed the sacrosanct concept of laissez faire and demanded political action to check exploitation and alleviate suffering. Humanitarians generally sought to apply the principles of the Christian religion to social and economic problems and often relied more upon private philanthropy than upon political activity.[1]

Agitation for domestic reform had a concomitant in humanitarian and reformist concern for the progress and consequences of overseas imperialism. Many reformers thought that the money, energy, and attention required by an expansionistic imperial policy could be more wisely used meeting the needs of the people of Britain. Indeed, some reformers and humanitarians thought that expansion abroad and domestic reform were mutually exclusive. The belief that reform and imperialism were incompatible was an old Liberal proposition.[2] Early in his career W. E. Gladstone, later the leader of the Liberal Party, believed the colonies tended inexorably toward political maturity and independence. Consequently, he argued that the colonies should be prepared for self-government.[3]

Gladstone's attitude toward the empire changed and by the 1870's he was no longer convinced that the Empire would inevitably disintegrate. However, he never grew to like the idea of imperial expansion and often complained during Beaconsfield's last government that expansion drained off funds needed for the Liberal program of domestic reform.[4] During the period 1878-1880 a host of Liberal candidates echoed Gladstone's arguments and accused the Tories of neglecting the welfare of the people of England in favor of expansionist adventures abroad.[5]

Much of the criticism of expansion and of the administration of the Empire was voiced by politicians, but not all, and in any case the line between humanitarians and politicians is not easy to draw. Some politicians were humanitarians and some humanitarians became involved in politics. A prime example of the latter hybrid was Dr. Richard M. Pankhurst,[6] husband of the famous suffragette Emmeline Pankhurst.[7] Dr. Pankhurst was a radical with a passionate interest in social reform. He served as legal counsel in the case of *Chorlton v Lings* (1868) when 5,346 women householders claimed the vote under existing law. In 1882 he drafted the Women's Property Bill which sought to increase the property rights of married women. So vigorous was his concern for the rights of women that he and his wife left the Liberal Party in

1884, when Gladstone refused to put Women's Suffrage into the Reform Bill of 1884, and joined the Independent Labour Party. Pankhurst was highly antagonized by Tory expansionism because he thought that it prevented reform. In 1879 he offered an anti-expansionist resolution at a meeting of the Manchester Liberal Association which charged that

> The Government during its tenure of office has seriously neglected domestic legislation, and the prosecution of its foreign policy has wasted the natural resources.[8]

An important factor in humanitarian and reforming activity was religion, especially religious nonconformity. Many humanitarians were either clergymen themselves or members of a sect other than the Church of England. Some such figures were involved in politics and some were not, but of those who were a number were Radical Liberals. Thus Thomas Bayley Potter,[9] a Unitarian and a Radical Liberal from Manchester, denounced imperial expansion on reformist and political grounds, arguing that Beaconsfield's "spirited foreign policy" was a trick to distract the attention of the people of Britain from the dire need for social and economic reforms in England.[10]

The outbreak of the Afghan wars, which raged in sporadic fashion during the late 1870's angered many reformers and humanitarians both in and out of politics. The hostilities in Afghanistan began when the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton,[11] impetuously provoked a war without the authorization of the Tory government in London. The Prime Minister, although entertaining plans for a move against Afghanistan, did not want war at that time and was privately angry at Lytton.[12] Nevertheless, the ministry defended the Viceroy thereby provoking an avalanche of angry criticism by foes of the "forward policy."[13]

One of the critics who came out against the government on humanitarian and reformist grounds was Lt. Col. Robert Durie Osborn,[14] a retired Army officer with many years of service in India. The son of an employee of the East India Company stationed in India, Osborn knew the Indian people well and was a zealous advocate of native rights and a vigorous critic of Lytton's callous disregard for Indian rights and sentiments, and for the rights of the native government of Afghanistan. Osborn castigated Lytton for causing a war of "deliberately planned aggression, utterly unjustified." He blamed the government and the Prime Minister for fostering expansionism as part of the Tory program.[15] He explicitly denied the ministry's statement that Russia was interested in Afghanistan.[16]

Fiscal reformers joined in opposing the Afghan War, but for quite different reasons than humanitarians. Fiscal reformers sought to cut the costs of government and wars cost money. Thus Samuel Laing,[17] a critic of 'Little

Englandism', denounced the Afghan War as a conflict which provoked Russia and threatened international war.[18] As Finance Minister in India in 1860 he had taken office determined to cut the budget deficits by reducing military costs. He remarked at that time, "the possibility of military reduction depends on peace."[19] He felt that Lytton and "what is called the 'Imperial Policy' " were both dangerous and should be terminated.[20] The Liberal Party was dedicated to the belief that taxes and the costs of government should be cut as low as possible. Gladstone, as the leading spokesman of his party, denounced the war as an "immense, unnatural, and unnecessary expenditure" which absorbed "enormous sums" which should have been spent for "profitable production." [21]

Critics of the ministry's "forward policy" hardly had time to catch their breath when another prancing proconsul caused a war in southern Africa with the Zulus. The government's policy of consolidation and expansion took the form of a plan for confederation, engineered by the Colonial Office, which sought to confederate the Boer and British states in southern Africa.[22] By implication the plan threatened the autonomy of the Zulus, but Lord Carnarvon,[23] the Colonial Secretary, and his agents were determined to implement the plan. The situation was complicated by the fact that droves of prospectors and miners were pouring into Zulu territory in search of diamonds in the newly discovered fields. [24]

Carnarvon wanted to delay the implementation of the plan for an indefinite period due to the fact that British relations with Russia were seriously strained over disputes in the Near and Middle East and the government did not want to involve itself in additional difficulties in southern Africa. The Colonial Office explicitly directed the High Commissioner in southern Africa to maintain peaceful relations with the Zulus. The High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere,[25] was not deterred, however, and impetuously sent an altimatum to the Zulus. Upon the expiration of the ultimatum Frere ordered armed forces into action against the Zulus.[26]

The unexpected outbreak of war provoked a barrage of Liberal criticism against the ministry and its forward policy.[27] John Morley,[28] a mordant critic of Tory expansionism in India and Africa, lampooned Frere and branded the war as unjust. Morley asserted that the conflict distracted public attention from Britain's pressing domestic problems and declared,

> The strongest and most substantial reason
> against the policy of intermeddling... lies
> in the fact that the people and Government
> of England have at least as much as they can
> do if they attend to their own affairs.

He also charged that the actions of the ministry and its agents in Africa sapped the confidence of native peoples in British administrators in the colonies, thereby undermining future relations.[29]

A number of non-political figures attacked the government for instigating the Zulu War. James Guiness Rogers,[30] a prominent Congregationalist clergyman and a proponent of the application of Christian principles to public questions, denounced Carnarvon's plan for confederation as the fundamental cause of the conflict.[31] Miss Frances Colenso,[32] the humanitarian daughter of Bishop John W. Colenso,[33] blamed Frere and other British officials as the instigators of the Zulu War. She rejected British charges that the government of the Zulu people was brutal and stated that the real reason for the war was camouflaged by unprincipled officials who were collaborating with land-hungry colonists to despoil the Zulus of their property. Miss Colenso accused the British administration and military of conducting not only an unjust war but also of perpetrating atrocities against the natives:

> We destroyed crops and immense quantities
> of provisions... (and) carried off herds....
> What had been the effect of our invasions
> of the Zululand ... a dreadful famine pre-
> vailed last year in parts of the Zululand.
> The wretched people creeping about on all
> fours....

Indeed, Miss Colenso, who strongly subscribed to the belief that Britain had a providential role and mission to bring civilization and protection to primitive peoples, felt that the imperial administration had treacherously betrayed the trust by its aggressions against the Zulus.[34]

Two years after the Zulu War Miss Colenso published a critical study of the war entitled *The History of the Zulu War and Its Origins.*[35] Later, in 1884, she wrote a polemic called *The Ruin of the Zululand* which flayed the British administration and its policies in southern Africa. "Evil passions," she alleged, bred violence and exploitation in the region.

> Hasty or arbitary action on the part of
> the Government officials, assisted by
> the land-hunger and contempt for the
> colored races of a certain noisy faction
> amongst the colonists (had caused wars and
> injustice in southern Africa).

She had compiled a "black national catalogue," she said, which contained the details of British greed, aggression, and abuses in the region during and after the war. She accused the colonists of seeking pretexts for war.[36] Such was the

case with Frere and the colonial newspaper editors who pretended that the Zulus were plotting a war in order to justify the British attack. The ruse sufficed to allow the colonists to steal native lands.[37] Of course, she noted, appropriate falsehoods were conveyed to Parliament and the press in Britain to deceive the public.

Benjamin Pine,[39] a veteran colonial administrator and a former Governor of Natal from 1873 to 1875, drew upon his administrative experience in Africa in writing an indictment of colonial administration and of the Zulu War. He said that some administrators conspired with diamond mining companies to pay native employees with firearms. The weapons were sometimes used against British colonists. It was this sort of myopic selfishness and exploitation, declared Pine, which turned the Zulus against the British.[40] This kind of critism of the gun and drink trade was repeated by other humanitarians over the years.[41]

Humanitarians and reformers were by no means solely concerned with the consequences of imperialism upon England, but were solicitous about the welfare of native peoples in Africa and Asia. The British, strongly imbued with the ethic of duty espoused by the Evangelicals, believed themselves an "Elect People." This conviction became a principal element in late Victorian imperialism.[42] Yet the burdens of the Empire were heavy. The humanitarians were willing to bear them and were shocked by corruption and callousness of imperial administrators who allowed and sometimes even conspired in the sale of drink, drugs, and guns to the natives.[43]

Generally, university educated, religious, and idealistic in their concern for the peoples of Africa and Asia, the humanitarians wanted to give primitive peoples clothing, Christianity and literacy. The interest of the reformers was less altruistic. They wanted to cut the costs of the Empire and reduce the dangers of imperialism. Both groups served as watchdogs in the Empire.

1 Herman Ausubel, *The Late Victorians*, New York, 1955, pp. 56-60.

2 The Liberals generally opposed the acquisition of overseas territories during the middle of the nineteenth century. Although few of them were separationists, that is those who wanted to jettison the Empire, most of them disliked the dangers, violence, expense and additional responsibility of new regions in Africa and Asia. See John S. Galbraith, "Myths of the 'Little England' Era," *American Historical Review*, LXVIII (October, 1961), 34-48.

3 *Hansard*, III, 104, April 16, 1849, p. 354.

4 *The Manchester Guardian*, December 3, 1878.

5 *Daily News*, January 13, 1879.

6 Dr. Richard Marsden Pankhurst (d. 1898) was a barrister and radical reformer with an especially strong interest in women's rights. He gained fame in the voting rights case of *Chorlton v Lings* (1868) and in drafting the Married Women's Property Bill of 1882. The Pankhurst home was a center for reformers, Fabians, and labor leaders such as Charles Dilke, William Morris, James Keir Hardie, and Mrs. Desant. *Dictionary of National Biography* (1922-1930), pp. 652-653 (hereafter cited as *DNB*).

[7] Emmeline Pankhurst (1858-1928) became increasingly militant in her agitation for women's suffrage. She founded the Women's Political and Social Union in 1903 and subsequently led a campaign in which women broke windows, chained themselves to fences, screamed at ministers, and even committed suicide to secure the ballot. She was frequently jailed. After World War I she went to Canada to speak for social hygiene and child welfare. *DNB* (1922-1930), pp. 652-653.

[8] *The Manchester Guardian*, January 13, 1879.

[9] Thomas Bayley Potter (1817-1898) was the son of a prosperous family of prominent Liberals and Unitarians in Manchester. His father was a leading member of the Manchester School and his uncle Richard Potter (d. 1842) was an M. P. for Wigan known as "Radical Dick." The wholesale house of the Potter family was a rendezvous for political and philanthropic reformers and one of the offices was called the "plotting room." Thomas chaired the Manchester Branch of the Complete Suffrage Society beginning in 1840. He supported the North in the American Civil War and founded the Union and Emancipation Society in 1863 to raise money for the Union. He was elected to Parliament in 1865 for Rochdale and remained until 1895 where he championed free trade. The Potter family helped to found the *Manchester Guardian*. *DNB*, XXII (Supplement), 1153-1154.

[10] *The Manchester Guardian*, April 10, 1879.

[11] Edward R. Bulwer, Lord Lytton (1831-1891) was educated in Britain and Germany. He held minor diplomatic positions before becoming minister to Portugal (1874-1876). He was Viceroy of India (1876-1880) and ambassador in Paris (1887-1891). *DNB*, XII, 387-392.

[12] Robert Blake, *Disraeli*, New York, 1966, p. 662.

[13] *Daily News*, November 13, 1878.

[14] Robert Durie Osborn (1835-1889) was born and raised in India. He became a professional soldier, participating in the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny and the Afghan War. He bitterly opposed the forward policy and retired in protest in 1879. Thereafter he wrote prodigiously on Indian and Egyptian affairs, especially on Indian rights and Indian claims to self-government. He even helped found the short-lived London *Statesman* (1879-1880) to protest Lytton's policy in India. He was also interested in theology and wrote articles on the theology of F. D. Maurice. *DNB*, XIV, 1175-1176 and London *Times*, April 25, 1889.

[15] Robert D. Osborn, "India Under Lord Lytton," *Contemporary Review*, XXXVI, (December, 1879), 552-573.

[16] Robert D. Osborn, "The Last Phase of the Afghan War," *Contemporary Review*, XXXVIII, (September, 1880), 434-445.

[17] Samuel Laing (1812-1897) was educated at Cambridge and Lincoln's Inn. He became an expert in business, especially in railroads. Elected to Parliament as a Liberal in 1852, he lost his seat for opposing British intervention in China in 1857. Appointed Finance Minister In India (1860), he sought to cut the budget by reducing military costs and advocating peace. He was elected again and served 1865-1868, 1873-1885. He opposed the anti-imperialistic leanings of Gladstone and rejected 'Little England' ideas. After retirement in 1885 he wrote extensively on religion, the origins of man, and on Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. *DNB* XXII (Supplement), 948-950. Obituary in London *Times*, August 7, 1897.

[18] Samuel Laing, "The Crisis in Indian Finance," *Nineteenth Century*, VII (January-June, 1880), 1068-1073.

[19] *DNB*, XXII (Supplement), 949.

[20] Letter to the Editor, *Daily News*, November 5, 1878.

[21] *The Manchester Guardian*, December 3, 1878.

[22] Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians, The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent*, New York, 1961, p. 55.

[23] Henry Molyneaux Herbert, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon (1831-1890) became Colonial Secretary in 1866 and again in 1874. A proponent of imperialism, he suggested the confederation of the colonies in southern Africa and North America. In 1885 he joined the Imperial Federation League. *DNB*, IX, 646-652.

[24] C. W. DeKiewiet, *A History of Southern Africa*, Oxford, 1942, pp. 101-107.

[25] Sir Bartle Frere (1815-1884) was Resident at Sattara in 1846 and Chief Commissioner of Sind (1850-1859). He became Governor of Bombay (1862-1867) and in 1877 became High Commissioner in southern Africa. *DNB*, VII, 697-706.

[26] Blake, pp. 666-669.

[27] *Spectator*, January 1, February 15,22, 1879; *Daily News*, February 12, 13, 1879.

[28] John Morley (1838-1923) was a leading editor, writer, and reformer in the late nineteenth century. An idealist by nature, Morley wrote for secular education, land reform, progressive taxation, and disestablishment. His writings were influenced by his radicalism, agnosticism, and leanings toward republicanism. As editor of the *Fortnightly Review* (1867-1882) he converted the publication into the recognized organ of Radicalism. Elected M. P. in 1883, he opposed Gladstone's intervention in Egypt and the coercion of Ireland. He became Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1886 and again in 1892 and was a proponent of reconciliation and recognition of Irish grievances. Toward the end of his political career he opposed the Boer War and had serious reservations about Britain's entrance into World War I. *DNB*, (1922-1930), 616-624.

[29] John Morley, "The Plain Story of the Zulu War," *Fortnightly Review*, New Series XXV (January-June, 1879), 329.

[30] James Guiness Rogers (1822-1911) was the son of a preacher in the Irish Evangelical Society, a Congregational sect. Educated at Trinity College, Dublin and Lancaster Independent College, Manchester, he was ordained in 1846 and became minister of St. James' Chapel at Newcastle-on-Tyne. Later in life he became chairman of local and national Congregational unions. Throughout his life he was concerned about social and economic and public problems and he wrote articles on them in the *Nineteenth Century*. He edited the publication *Congregational Review* for four years beginning in 1887. A partisan of the idea that public movements required a religious basis, he found grounds for agreement with Gladstone and formed a friendship with the Liberal leader. During his life he published many articles on theology and religion. *DNB*, Supplement, III (1910-1911), 225-226. Obituary in London *Times*, August 21, 1911.

[31] J. Guiness Rogers, "The Union of the Liberal Party," *Nineteenth Century*, VI (July-December, 1879) 361.

[32] Frances Colenso (1849-1887) was the second daughter of John W. Colenso, the first Bishop of Natal and a vigorous humanitarian and friend of native peoples. Influenced by her father, Miss Colenso made it her business to know and care for native Africans. A resident of Natal from early childhood, she wrote against Frere and the Zulu War. *DNB*, XI, 749. Obituary in London *Times*, May 2, 1887.

[33] John W. Colenso (1814-1883) attended Cambridge and entered the ministry in spite of dire family financial hardships. Intense, determined on the ministry, and evangelically oriented from youth, he remained strongly moralistic and humanitarian throughout his life. After teaching at Harrow, Colenso became Bishop of the newly organized colony of Natal in 1853. His contact with the natives provoked a profound rethinking of Christian principles on such questions as that of "the intelligent Zulu" and that of native polygamy. He disliked polygamy, but realized that the divorce of polygamous wives would only make matters worse. His equivocal views on polygamy stirred considerable controversy. In an effort to

educate the Zulus he supervised the publication of a grammar, dictionary, and several readers in the Zulu language. Colenso was frequently in trouble for his efforts to protect the natives from exploitation and for his theological essays which often advanced heretical propositions. In 1863 the Bishop of Capetown deposed and excommunicated Bishop Colenso, causing a subsequent split in the ranks of the faithful, but a privy council decision nullified the actions. Bishop Colenso blamed Frere for the Zulu War and struggled to secure the restoration of Cetewayo as chief of the Zulus. *DNB*, IV, 746-749.

[34] Frances Colenso, "Zululand After the War," *Contemporary Review*, XXXXI (February, 1882), 54-71. Donald R. Morris warns that Miss Colenso and her father were strongly prejudiced against Frere and that their writings on the Zulu War "must be read with enormous caution." *The Washing of the Spears*, New York, 1965, p. 619.

[35] Frances Colenso and Edward Durnford, *A History of the Zulu War and its Origins*, London, 1881. It should be noted that Colenso's co-author was a Lieutenant Colonel whose brother was killed at the disastrous battle of Isandhlwana in 1879 when the Zulus ambushed a British detachment. London *Times*, May 2, 1887.

[36] Frances E. Colenso, *The Ruin of the Zululand*, London, 1884, pp. xi-xvi.

[37] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War*, pp. 4-5. Essentially the same indictment of British administration was published by James Sanderson, editor of the *Natal Colonist* newspaper. He impugned colonial officials for conspiring with colonists to exploit, abuse, and rob the natives. Like Miss Colenso he thought that British had a paternal responsibility to protect primitive peoples. Sanderson also joined with the Colensos in defending Colonel Edward Durnford when administrators tried to make him the scapegoat for military failures during the Zulu War. Morris, p. 222 and James Sanderson, "The Transvaal and the Zulu War." *Fortnightly Review*, New Series XXIII (January-June, 1878), 941.

[38] Colenso, *The Ruin of the Zululand*, p. xi.

[39] Benjamin Pine (1809-1891) attended Cambridge and Gray's Inn before being called to the bar in 1841. In the same year he became Queen's Advocate in Sierra Leone. He became temporary Governor of Sierra Leone in 1848 and suppressed native warfare and pillage. He subsequently served as Governor of Natal, a position he held twice, and as Governor of the Gold Coast and Lt. Governor of St. Christopher in the West Indies. He retired in 1880. He was a proponent of political and constitutional reforms and a writer on the problems of African colonies. *DNB*, XV, 1198.

[40] Benjamin Pine, "The Boers and the Zulus," *Contemporary Review*, XXXV (June, 1879), 541-570.

[41] See as an example of this type of humanitarian criticism from a later period an article by F. W. Farrar, "Africa and the Drink Trade," *Contemporary Review* LII (July, 1887), 44-54. F. W. Farrar (1831-1903) was born in the British fort at Bombay. His father was a chaplain of the Church Missionary Society. He attended King William's College in England where the training was evangelical, but inferior, and in 1847 became Headmaster of the College. He subsequently attended King's College and the University of London, taking his B. A. in 1852. Continuing his education, he received the M. A. and D. D. at Cambridge. Ordained a priest in 1857, he became Chaplain to Queen Victoria in 1869, was accepted in the canonry at Westminster in 1875, where he fought drunkeness in the Westminster slums, and in 1890 became Chaplain of the House of Commons. Near the end of his life he became Dean of Canterbury. Farrar's interest in academic and religious subjects was great and he wrote a great deal. His work on philology caused Charles Darwin

to nominate him to the Royal Society. His popular *Life of Christ* (1874) sold thirty editions prior to 1903 and was translated into many languages. His theology was not strictly orthodox and he challenged such doctrines as that of the eternality of hell. *DNB*, Supplement, II, Vol III, pp. 9-12. Obituary in London *Times*, March 23, 1903.

42 G. M. Young, *Victorian England, Portrait of an Age*, London, 1953, pp. 4-5.

43 Farrar, pp. 44-54.

OLIN D. JOHNSTON AND THE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT CONTROVERSY

Jay Bender

It appeared that October 28, 1935 was going to be another ordinary Monday in the city of Columbia, capital of the state of South Carolina. One approaching the State Office Building, however, would have beheld an astonishing sight. Surrounding the building were 61 members of the South Carolina Militia, re-enforced with four machine guns, barring highway department employees and officials from entering the offices of the State Highway Commission. That morning, Governor Olin D. Johnston declared the Commission to be in a state of "rebellion, insurrection, resistence, and insurgency...and thus subject to control by the state militia." This order answered the specific questions. But there remained a question of a larger scope: For what reason had Governor Johnston declared the Commission insurgent and rebellious to a point which necessitated troops?

The conflict between Olin Johnston and the State Highway Commission originated in 1929 when South Carolina was joining other southern states in the building of road networks to bolster a fast-sagging Southern economy. State law prohibited bonds for road projects, and the state was forced to finance highway construction by a method entitled "pay-as-you-go."[2] Governor John C. Richards had supported a bill calling for a $65 million road bond issue.[3] Although state law required that the bill be submitted to a popular referendum, since it involved the constitutional question of raising the state debt, the approved measure provided for no such vote. When its opponents tested its legality, the State Supreme Court ruled 3-2 that the measure was unconstitutional. The Constitution required that when constitutional questions were not unanimously settled by the Supreme Court, the circuit judges must be summoned. The *enbanc court* overruled the Supreme Court justices, calling the law a tax, not a bond issue, and thus not requiring a popular referendum.[4]

The chief opponents to the road bond measure were from the "up-country", a locality in which the roads were in much better condition than in other parts of the state. The leader of these bond foes was Representative Olin DeWitt Johnston of Spartanburg. Johnston argued that such a large increase in the state debt would cause the state to go bankrupt, and that his constituents were being forced to pay an additional tax to build "low-country" roads. He blamed the measure's success on the powerful influence exerted by the State Highway Commission and its chief commissioner, Benjamin M. Sawyer. Johnston continued the fight in his 1930 gubernatorial race, campaigning vigorously against the bond issue, being defeated by a mere 998 votes. Johnston, suspicious of Ibra C. Blackwood's large Charleston vote, requested a recount. The Democratic Executive

Committee found no evidence of fraud because the Charleston ballots had been mysteriously burned. Johnston, convinced of fraud, attributed his defeat to the influence of Ben Sawyer. In 1934, Johnston ran again for the governorship, stumping the state calling for a reorganization of tghe Highway Department and the removal of Sawyer. [5]

On Tuesday, January 15, 1935, Olin DeWitt Johnston became the Governor of South Carolina. In his inaugural address, he reminded the citizens of the campaign issue of highway reorganization. Stating that his overwhelming victory had been a mandate of the people to change the department, he called for the immediate resignation of Ben Sawyer and the entire Highway Commission. The citizens, he said, had given the department "... its day in the court of public opinion." Calling the department "...a political octopus". Johnston accused the commission of building a gigantic political machine to gain control of the state and said that orderly reorganization would begin when the present commission resigned. Two days later, having received no resignations, he wrote each commissioner, asking for his resignation in obedience to the peoples' mandate. When neither letters, nor verbal demands, nor the rumor of state troops seemed to sway the commissioners from their adamant refusal to resign, Johnston turned to the legislature for highway reorganization. [6]

On January 25, 56 Johnston supporters in the House introduced a highway reorganization measure which called for a six-member commission, representing each congressional district, to be appointed by the governor. Johnston said that the bill would "eliminate the expansive control of the commission" and permit reorganization. The Governor's optimism quickly faded when the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the measure. Representative E. C. Lewis of Anderson had introduced an opposition reorganization which gave the legislative delegations the power of electing 14 highway commissioners from their judicial circuits. [7] The rival bills were debated in committee on the same day. No one spoke in favor of the Johnston bill yet eleven of the highway commissioners testfied against. The Committee gave an unfavorable report to Johnston's bill and a favorable recommendation to the Lewis measure. [8]

Johnston warned that he might veto an important liquor bill if his measure did not get approval. On February 12, both bills were reported for debate with the Johnston bill calendared first. The next day, with the Governor present in the chamber, the House tied, 55-55, on a motion for passage. On a second motion, the House voted to continue the Johnston bill by a 56-54 vote. Johnston declared that the fight had just begun and vowed to seek a more favorable legislature in 1936.[9] The Lewis bill was passed and sent to the Senate. In final form, it called for the legislative election of 14 commissioners with removal power over the commissioners transferred from the governor to the individual legislative delegations.[10]

After the failure of the reorganization bill, Johnston moved to fulfill another campaign promise — the $3 auto license tag. Fighting through March and April against highway department lobbyists, Johnston gained final passage for the lower tag on April 24 and sent the measure to the Senate.[11] After this partial victory, the Governor prepared to fulfill still another pledge by seeking to remove Ben Sawyer. Johnston requested that the House Appropriations Committee itemize the state budget.[12] The budget was passed by the House and on May 14, Johnston vetoed Sawyer's salary, citing again the mandate of the people for Sawyer's removal. In a speech the following day, Johnston compared Sawyer to Huey Long and declared that he had ended "Sawyer-ism", a disease he considered worse than Long-ism.[13]

As the legislative session neared its end, the Senate amended the $3 tag bill with the Lewis reorganization bill. The House concurred. On May 17, the measure was sent to Johnston but the Governor was not fooled. He vetoed the entire bill, calling it a "hybrid bill" designed and politically manipulated to embarrass him as governor.[14] The legislature made no attempt to override the veto. The Johnston opponents had succeeded in forcing Johnston to veto his own bill. Representative Solomon Blatt of Barnwell said the following about the maneuver:

> We made him veto his own bill....We wanted to go back to the people and tell them that Johnston vetoed your $3 license tag. That was the reason that was done. That was a deliberate thing in which I took a very active part.... The purpose of it was to say to the people that Governor Johnston had promised you a $3 tag, we gave you the $3 tag and to show his lack of sincerity, he vetoed it....He came out for a $3 tag and we gave him the $3 tag and we provided that the (road) commissioners would be closer to the people by putting one in each judicial circuit. Rather than way away from you, we would put a man right in your midst to see that your area was protected. The Governor didn't want you to have that protection — he wanted to be a dictator and rule that department and rather than give you representation on there, he was even willing to go back on that promise that he made to give you a $3 tag and he vetoed it .... Your own governor vetoed that bill and denied you the right to have a $3 license tag.[15]

After adjournment, Johnston made no moves at reorganization, and Ben Sawyer continued to function as chief commissioner. On June 6, the Highway Commission held its first meeting since Sawyer's salary had been cut, after

which chairman C. O. Hearon had "no comment" to questions by the press as to commission action on Sawyer's status.[16] By August, Johnston became impatient that, despite his requests, he had seen no attempts by the commission either to remove Sawyer or to determine his status. On August 22, he informed the commission that he would hold up an $11 million road project by refusing to sign replacement bonds as long as Sawyer remained in office. Johnston said that he regarded the retention of Sawyer as a direct slap and remarked, "We will see whether Ben Sawyer is bigger than $11 million in the eyes of the State Highway Commission." The Commission replied by hiring Sawyer as chief commissioner with a salary of $4,400 and passing a resolution that road programs could be financed with county and regular state road bonds.[17]

In a radio message on September 4, Johnston declared three vacancies on the Commission and appointed three supporters — J. C. Long, L. C. Richardson, and W. L. Rhodes — with orders for them to assume office immediately. The Governor based his action on an opinion received from State Attorney General John M. Daniel that terms of four commissioners had expired on April 15, 1935 under a statute which required commissioners to run continuously for four years each without staying in office until a successor was qualified.[18] Ousted Commissioner W. F. Lightsey said that he would remain in office until otherwise ordered by the courts or the legislature. The old commission continued to function and the Johnston appointees were ignored, despite a warning by the Governor that he would use his constitutional power to call in the militia in a state of emergency unless his men were seated on the commission.[19] Despite this threat, the commission continued to operate. On October 9, the Commission, after meeting with the Governor, met and refused to seat the Johnston appointees. Commissioner George Bell Timmerman stated that since the new men lacked Senate confirmation, they were not legal appointees. The commission said it would not oust the incumbents until so ordered by the courts.[20]

Johnston waited for the state courts to take some action in this direction but when none appeared forthcoming, he issued an executive order calling for Chairman C. O. Hearon, and Commissioners E. L. Culler and John C. Bethea to appear before him on October 23 and show cause why they should not be ousted from office. The order contained a list of ten charges, including illegally paying Sawyer's salary without authority and in defiance of state law. Other allegations included refusing to seat Johnston's appointees and illegal oil bids, truck rentals, and gasoline purchases.[21]

The hearings began in the Governor's office on October 23. As their reason for not seating the Johnston men, the commissioners accused the Governor of trying to control the commission by appointing men who would act in accordance with his views, and cited a statute requiring Senate confirmation for gubernatorial appointees. As to charges concerning Sawyer,

they said that they understood that they had the statuatory right to decide Sawyer's salary and if the action had been illegal, then the state treasurer would not have paid the vouchers. Next day, Johnston's attempts to show crooked dealings by the commissioners was squashed by testimony of Spartanburg accountant Joe Calus, who testified that in auditing the highway department books, he found only 4 of the 1700 accounts in error and these errors had been in the state's favor. On October 25, Commissioner Bethea told of an effort by Johnston to force himself, along with Culler and E. S. Booth to support the Governor and his appointees or face removal from office.[22]

With this disclosure, the hearings were adjourned. Another problem arose on October 26 when Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Stabler, on petition from the Commission, signed an order for Johnston's appointees to appear in court to show cause why they should be allowed to take office, and issued a temporary restraining order against them until the completion of such hearings.[23] Johnston was faced with a dilemma. His appointees had been restrained by the courts, they were facing show cause hearings, and he personally had been accused of questionable dealings in hearings he had called against the commission.

Before dawn on Monday, October 28, the Governor, by executive proclamation, ordered 61 National Guardsmen to the State Office Building with orders to take over the Highway Commission Offices, and ordered Sawyer, the Commissioners, and all department employees to vacate all department property. Since Johnston was not going to be allowed by the courts or the legislature to reorganize the department his own way, he would have to use the militia. The Governor explained his startling action later that morning in "An Address to the Citizens of South Carolina." The force had been necessary, he said, to remove Sawyer and the Commission since they had"... set up a supreme government answerable neither to the people, the legislature, the Attorney General, or the Governor."[24] Announcing that he was taking charge of the department to end "... trickery and subterfuge, favoritism and irregularities," the Governor referred to his unanswered inaugural demand for resignations, the legislative defeat, the refusal to seat appointees, and the removal proceedings testimony as the reasons which convinced him that only mobilization of troops would compel them to obey the will of the people after all else had failed.[25] Later that day, the Governor, in another executive order, set up the new administrative organization of the department, calling for an executive manager and five consulting managers who would have full supervision over roads, machinery, and records.[26] In letters to State Treasurer E. P. Miller and State Comptroller A. J. Beattie, the Governor ordered the department funds under the authorizing signature of Joe Calus, new executive manager.[27] In meeting the press later, Johnston and Calus announced that all 2000 department employees were being asked to resign.[28]

Reaction to the military coup was varied. Sawyer and the commissioners could not be reached for comment with the exception of Timmerman who said that the people would have to choose between a rebellious dictator or a regular governor.[29] From Johnston appointee J. C. Long came the remark that the Governor's actions were in the interest of good government and the people.[30] The Charleston *News & Courier* ran an editorial calling the action pitiful, comical, childish, and dangerous.[31]

The next day, Johnston made further moves to secure his control on the commission by dispatching Major Frank Barnwell and a squadron of occupation troops to three Columbia banks to confiscate highway department funds on deposit.[32] The troops entered the South Carolina National, the Citizens and Southern, and the Lower Main Street banks, all which had halted payment of funds the previous day, and by mid-morning had seized $1,871,352 in deposited funds. Calus announced that 75% of the resignations were in, explaining that they were only a precautionary measure against disloyalty and that each employee would be rehired as his loyalty was determined. With funds now under control of the new board, the resignations coming in, and the ousted men making no attempt to gain their offices, it appeared that Johnston had gained full control of the department.[33]

The road board hit its first legal snag on October 29 when Comptroller A. J. Beattie announced that he had been advised by the Attorney General that since the Governor had not ordered funds paid in his proclamation, then the new board had no valid claim to them. Beattie refused to pay requests signed by Calus saying that he lacked the authority, adding that since the state of emergency suspended his control over the finances, the military troops should handle the money.[34]

During all this controversy, the ousted commissioners were working to get back into office. On October 30, they filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking their reinstatement. A process server was dispatched with an order freezing all funds and calling for hearings before the Chief Justice at which the Calus board should show cause why they should not be removed from office. The process server, James G. Dreker, arrived at the Office Building that afternoon. Calus summoned Major Barnwell and instructed him to remove Dreker from the building. Dreker threw a copy of the court order on the desk and after having it given back to him, threw it on the floor. It was stuffed back into his pocket as he was ejected from the building by two troopers. Dreker returned to the courthouse, declaring that the order had been legally and properly served. Attaches in the Governor's office later announced that Johnston did not consider the order legally served because Calus had not touched it. In response to the court order, Johnston said that funds would be found, despite the freeze, and that he had no intention of returning department control to its former managers.[35]

The first week of military-backed control of the highway department

drew to a close with the problem of money still in the spotlight. From Washington, Public Roads Bureau Chief Thomas H. MacDonald announced that federal road funds were being withheld until the legality of the Johnston board could be determined. In Charleston, U. S. Postmaster E. C. Goza suspended payment on all postal money orders addressed to the Commission or to Calus to prevent local license inspectors from sending desperately needed funds to Columbia. Added to this was the fact that Calus was a day late in meeting the department payroll.[36]

The second major problem was the legal one. There had been no more attempts by the courts to serve any orders but Johnston, taking no chances, had all six commissioners escorted by militia and ordered guards to obtain purpose-of-business statements from anyone entering the building.[37] Calus learned that the court order which he had refused had been legally served and he ordered commission lawyers to prepare briefs for the hearing. The attorneys argued that the board members were volunteers in the state militia called to active duty by the Governor. As a military board, they were not subject to any civil jurisdiction until the state of emergency was lifted.[38] On November 11, the hearings opened with Justice Stabler presiding. Arguments were exchanged as attorneys for the ousted men stated that the Governor had usurped the authority of the legislature and the courts when he forcefully took charge of the department, while Johnston's lawyers replied that the Governor had acted for the people. The hearings ended that same day with the verdict not expected before December.[39]

With the legal proceedings temporarily concluded, the commission attempted to accomplish some work. Things seemed to function normally as Calus called for bids for further road construction. On November 13, the Supreme Court released sufficient funds to meet department obligations through January 1. This order put the financial woes of the department at an end as it authorized funds to meet payrolls and to reimburse road bonds and their interest payments. State Treasurer E. P. Miller, however, refused to pay deposited federal funds for state-federal projects arguing that the court order had released only state money and that federal funds were still frozen.[40]

Up to this time, none of the reorganization which Johnston had promised had occurred. He had removed the old commissioners but he had made no further changes. On November 23, the first signs of some reorganization began as Calus fired three veteran employees, and two days later, eight more. Many employees feared that a kind of purge was being carried out.[41]

On December 5, the Supreme Court unanimously declared Johnston's seizure of the Commission unconstitutional, holding that a state of insurrection had not really existed. The 13 ousted commissioners were left in undisputed control of the department as they were returned to their jobs and the Johnston appointees were permanently restrained from the offices. Within an hour after the ruling, Johnston again mobilized the National Guard. The

Calus board left the offices following the court's announcement, and Johnston moved in troops under Major Barnwell, giving him complete control of the department.[42] Johnston did not stop with this military action. He had withheld his verdict on the show cause hearings until, on December 6, he removed Chairman Hearon and the two other commissioners for illegally paying Sawyer and refusing to seat his appointees.[43] On December 7, he suspended Ben Sawyer and the ten remaining commissioners and ordered them to show cause on December 13 why they should not be permanently removed. The commissioners were charged with the same violations as the other men, and Sawyer was charged with accepting a salary in violation of the law.[44] Johnston next called for the state legislature to convene in special session on December 10 to enact legislation calling for popular election of the Highway Commission. He had to implement some sort of reorganization in order to fulfill his campaign promises. There were 2400 employees working under a National Guard major who knew nothing about the department. With both federal and state funds frozen after the new military coup, mass unemployment remained a live possibility.

Johnston was certain to face problems with the legislature. He still had a large number of legislators opposed to highway reorganization, in addition to the fact that his image had been clouded by the October 28 coup and his defiance of the Supreme Court. As the lawmakers arrived in Columbia, early discussion centered around a proposal that the two houses should refrain from considering reorganization measures until all troops were removed. [45]

On Tuesday, December 10, the State Legislature was gaveled into special session. Johnston stated that he had no desire to be a dictator and had only used the militia to smash a "domineering political ring." The Governor's denial just aroused tempers more. Following the announcement that troops would remain until temporary reorganization laws were passed, Senator Harry Hughs asked his colleagues to approve legislation compelling the Governor to remove the troops. On December 12, the Senate passed a resolution, 39-3, stating that no legislation would be passed until troops were removed. It backed up its demand by refusing to consider confirmation of commission appointees submitted by Johnston to fill the vacancies left by Hearon, Culler, and Bethea. The House approved a similar measure, 108-3, requesting the Governor to comply with the court by returning control to the old commission and by pulling out troops.[46]

Johnston retained the troops and criticized the legislature for inactivity. He said that the state of emergency still existed and that the troops would remain until the rights of the people were preserved.[47] The stalemate continued. Johnston refused to budge and legislators advocating troop removal managed to bottle up reorganization measures in committee. On December 18, Representative Lewis reintroduced his bill, calling for legislative election of the commission and popular election of the chief. He

hoped that the popular election clause would appease the Governor. In a further attempt to gain some action several legislators formed a committee to meet with the Governor in an attempt to reach a compromise. The committee met with Johnston on December 19 and 20. The discussion was long and heated, and several times the success of the meeting was threatened by a walk-out. The Governor wanted a neutral road board to take over until permanent legislation could be enacted. The legislators remained firm in their contention that the first step must be the removal of troops. The Governor warned that he wanted to see legislation first, declaring that he would keep the troops forever and would even close the department. Finally, after much discussion, it was decided that Johnston would withdraw the troops and the legislature would establish a temporary road board for a 60-day term and to be headed by impartial people until the courts and the legislature could act on the issue permanently. Johnston was satisfied and the legislators returned to get the legislation approved.[49]

The final draft of the measure provided for a temporary commission to be headed by Treasurer Miller, Comptroller Beattie, and Sinking Fund Chairman F. C. Robinson, with management vested with Chief Highway Engineer J. S. Williamson. The Department was authorized to draw on funds from the state treasury to pay department debts until the freeze on funds was lifted. Johnston withdrew troops on December 20, and on the next day, signed the bill. At the same time, he announced that a petition had been filed in Supreme Court to release state highway funds, and that federal officials in Washington had released federal funds to the state. With this accomplishment, the legislature adjourned, planning to return in January to settle the matter permanently.[50]

The reorganization battle of 1936 began quickly. On January 3, the circuit courts heard an appeal from Hearon, Culler, and Bethea that they be reinstated. Their argument was that Johnston had ousted them as a result of court rulings against him and his military regime. Johnston's lawyers argued that the men had been found guilty in legally executed hearings of violating state law.[51] On January 10, Chief Judge C. E. Dennis handed down the first of the decisions as he found John C. Bethea innocent of all ten misconduct charges levied by Johnston, and ordered Bethea restored to office. The following day, C. O. Hearon and E. L. Culler were likewise cleared of all allegations and reinstated. Johnston had no comment but as he began show cause hearings for Sawyer and the ten remaining commissioners on January 16, he added additional charges to the initial list bringing the total to 28, and including such charges as influencing legislators and publishing a propaganda magazine.[52]

The regular session of the legislature convened on January 14. Johnston, in his "State of the State" address, hardly mentioned reorganization but the legislature knew it would face the issue. On the first full day of business,

Representative Arrowsmith introduced a reorganization measure similar to the old Lewis bill, calling for the present commissioners to take control until their terms expired, at which time their successors, including the chief commissioner would be elected by legislative delegations.[53] But action was stalled by a group advocating holding action on reorganization measures pending the outcome of the new show cause hearings. The Governor, in the meantime, had postponed the hearings indefinitely.[54]

There was one man who was tired of all the stalemates. Ben Sawyer, ousted Chief Commissioner, had been subjected to all levels of political inconvenience. His salary had been vetoed, he had been prohibited from entering his office, and he had been suspended and ordered to show cause before his political enemy why he should not be fired. With the announcement of postponement of the hearings, Sawyer, on January 18, petitioned the circuit courts to halt ouster proceedings against him and restore him to office. Circuit Judge G. D. Bellinger ordered Johnston to appear and show cause why his suspension of Sawyer was valid and why his removal attempts should not be restrained.[55]

Stalemate still reigned in the legislature where the Arrowsmith bill was stalled in committee. In February, however, the legislature came to life. On February 7, the Judiciary Committee announced that the old Lewis Arrowsmith bill, now titled the Blatt-Poag-Johnson Bill, was soon to be reported to the House. On February 10, a bill was introduced calling for road bonds to be issued without the governor's signature.[56]

On February 11, the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported the Blatt-Poag-Johnson Bill, worded so not to take effect until litigation over removal of the present commission was concluded. This enabled the legislature to maintain its stand against legislating the commission out of office before completion of removal hearings, and gave the legislature the time and machinery to reorganize the department as it most desired.[57]

The bill had hardly been reported when the Johnston cause suffered another setback. On February 14, Ben Sawyer was reinstated. Judge Bellinger declared Johnston's ouster of Sawyer null and void, dismissed removal proceedings against him, and permanently enjoined Johnston from further attempts to oust the chief.[58] Governor Johnston's only comment was that he would appeal the ruling.

The legislature was pleased. When the two houses met on February 19, there was no action to set up a new road board to replace the temporary board expiring February 20 as the legislators were waiting to see if Sawyer would come to work and save them the trouble of having to organize a new administration. On the 20th, Sawyer returned to his office for the first time since October 28, stating that it was his legal right and duty to take over and keep things running. Johnston responded declaring that Sawyer was not entitled to office until the appeal was settled. Sawyer stayed on, despite attempts by Johnston supporters in the legislature to oust him.[59]

On February 21, the House voted 48-25 to pass the amended Blatt-Poag-Johnson bill and sent it to the Senate.[60] When the bill reached the Senate, there were some more changes which the House refused to accept. The bill was sent to conference committee.[61]

During this time, Johnston suffered two more defeats. On March 1, the Supreme Court turned down his appeal on the Sawyer decision. The second defeat came on March 9 when Johnston was ordered to appear in Supreme Court and show cause why his suspension of the ten commissioners should not be lifted. The men argued that they had been given no hearing to justify their suspension.[62]

On April 10, the legislative conference committee reported a compromise measure which gave election of the commission to the legislature and its removal to the circuit courts. It called for 14 commissioners to be elected as soon as practical for four year staggered terms. The bill seemed to appease all factions but it was feared that Johnston would veto the measure as it took away his removal power and called for legislative rather than popular election.[63]

On April 13, Johnston lost the last of his court battles as the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that his removal of the ten commissioners was null and void. The commissioners were cleared of all charges and reinstated. The decision virtually closed the case of Johnston v. the Highway Department with the Governor overruled in all attempts to remove the incumbent commission. His only hope remained some type of legislative reorganization in his favor. But even here, he faced problems. The terms of eight commissioners expired on April 15, 1936. Johnston had appointed men to take these vacancies and if they were confirmed, he would have a majority of support on the board. But the Senate balked at confirmation, awaiting the outcome of the reorganization measure. Johnston opposed the bill because it provided for none of the restructuring ideas which he favored.[65]

Governor Johnston began his last-ditch offense on April 21 when he vetoed a road construction bill which permitted bond issues and payment of road expenditures upon concurrent legislative resolution. He stated that the bill denied him his constitutional power to sign bonds.[66] On April 22, the legislature approved the conference reorganization bill. Johnston vetoed it calling it a confirmation of the old commission structure. He said that this bill denied him of his removal and appointive powers and argued that an appointed circuit judge should not have the power of removal denied an elected governor.[67] On April 29, Johnston won a hollow victory when the Senate failed to override his veto. But in the House, the representatives voted to override and then immediately voted to reconsider their action.[68]

On May 1, Senator Harry Hughs delivered one of the most vehement attacks ever levied against the Governor. Johnston, he said, had started the highway issue to keep his own "political pot boiling." Calling Johnston a promise-breaker, he cited the reorganization veto as a change in principle

from 1929 when Johnston co-authored a bill calling for legislative election of the commission. Hughs said that Johnston's idea of reorganization was merely new personnel in an old organization.[69]

Johnston did not allow this attack to go unanswered. On May 2, he made an appeasing move by announcing that he would sign bonds for funds if the Senate would confirm his road appointees.[70] House members who had been working for a new compromise bill approached Johnston with two alternatives: They would write a reorganization incorporating most of his ideas or they would legislatively elect a completely new board. Johnston spurned these ideas.[71]

With the failure of the House to reach a compromise, the Senate decided to try. On May 7, it passed and sent to the House a reorganization bill which combined road bonds, reorganization, and a lower auto tag. The House approved and sent the measure to Johnston where it received a quick veto. The bill, he said, had not received the required three readings needed for passage.[72]

When the legislators sent the Triple Road Bill to the Governor, they expected him to veto it. But the authors hoped they could override this latest veto. On May 13, the first vote in the House failed to override by 3 votes, but again the legislators voted to reconsider their action. On May 14, the House and the Senate both overrode the veto making the Triple Road Act law. The bill called for the election of 14 commissioners by the legislative delegations of the 14 judicial circuits with the chief commissioner to be elected by the board members, and for removal of the commission only by the circuit courts. The price of auto tags was lowered and the power to sign road bonds was transferred from the governor to the state treasurer.[74]

With this action, the legislature accomplished what it had failed to do on two previous occasions. The highway department and the commission had been reorganized and the governor had been defeated in a struggle which had lasted for 17 months. There seemed to be little that Johnston could do without defying the courts and the legislature and it was doubted that Johnston would make any more attempts to control the department.

What were Olin Johnston's motives for such a violent campaign against the State Highway Commission? Was it for personal spite against Sawyer or did he actually believe that the department was a corrupt political ring? Did he really want reorganization? Did he believe that he had received a mandate from the people? Were his removal methods legal?

None of these questions can really be answered. It is apparent that Johnston had a personal motive against the department and especially Ben Sawyer. He blamed Sawyer for his defeat in the 1930 gubernatorial race. Johnston had to get rid of Sawyer because he was so powerful in the state, not because he was a corrupt political official. Attempts to show Sawyer as a crook proved futile. But Ben Sawyer was probably the most powerful man in the

state. He controlled an enormous number of votes and a lot of patronage power. Olin Johnston saw Sawyer as a political enemy, a man whose influence was so strong, powerful, and widespread that he could determine the success or failure of Johnston and his political career. His feeling about the commission itself was very similar. Johnston held no personal grudge against the commissioners, yet he saw them, like Sawyer, as a powerful influential body that could hamper any political ambitions that he might have. Because of this, Johnston decided that reorganization of the department was necessary. But it also appears that Johnston really wanted complete control of the department, that his objective was not reorganization but replacement with his supporters who would run the department his way. The court and legislative battles suggest that his concern was his power to appoint and remove commissioners so that he would have complete control. Johnston saw the commission as a political obstacle. With his own men on the board, the commission could become a valuable political tool. Johnston's main problem was that he had no grounds on which to remove men and appoint his own supporters. The commission was efficient, and Sawyer was a professional at road department administration. Even Johnston's hand-picked accountant could find no evidence of financial misconduct in the department.

As for the peoples' mandate, Johnston used the phrase frequently to enforce his actions. Johnston did have a great deal of support. He had been campaigning against road bonds and the road commission since 1929 and he was able to convince the people that road bonds were wrong and that Sawyer and the highway commission were a bunch of crooks running a political machine. But basically, Johnston used the phrase of a mandate so much that it became a convenient screen to justify all of his questionable activities. The legality of Johnston's actions appears shakey. It took several defeats in court for Johnston to be checkmated.

Was Olin Johnston trying to become a South Carolina Huey Long? That is open to speculation. Johnston apparently wanted complete control of the state and realized that he would have to get rid of the highway commission because of its powerful political influence. But where Long succeeded, Johnston failed. He did not have the wide range of political support, either in the legislature, on the local level, or on the court benches. Johnston had no effective political organization of any kind with which to combat the efficient organization of his opponents in the legislature or to undercut the influence of Sawyer and the Commission. Johnston did not have the support to play the game of demagogic pressure politics.

It was not until after the crisis had ended that the danger of the whole incident was realized. A state governor had manipulated the laws of the state and used the militia to purge the government of a personal political obstacle. The incident is a classic example of the executive branch attempting to thwart the authority of the legislative and judicial branches and thus upset the

American system of separation of powers. The 17-month struggle between Olin Johnston and the State Highway Commission will long remain an important chapter in South Carolina's history. Only because of the determination and strength of the legislature and the courts was Olin DeWitt Johnston forced to relinquish his fight against Ben Sawyer and the State Highway Commission.

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[1] Executive Proclamation, Governor Olin D. Johnston, October 28, 1935, South Carolina Archives, Olin D. Johnston Papers.

[2] "Pay-as-you-go" was a method by which money for road construction was budgeted from other sources in the state budget as it became available. Often times, road construction was delayed because of lack of money under this system. Ernest M. Lander, *A History of South Carolina, 1865-1960*, Chapel Hill, 1960, p. 69; Henry Steele Commager, "A South Carolina Dictator," *Current History*, XXXXIII (1936), 569; William L. Suttles, "The Struggle for State Control of Highways in South Carolina, 1908-1930," unpublished master's thesis, University of South Carolina, 1972, p. 57.

[3] Commager, p. 569; Suttles, p. 92.

[4] David D. Wallace, *South Carolina: A Short History*, Chapel Hill, 1951, pp. 680-681; Suttles, pp. 126-128.

[5] *New York Times*, November 3, 1935; *Newsweek*, November 9, 1935; Commager, p. 570; Suttles, p. 109; Lander, p. 70.

[6] Charleston *News and Courier*, January 15, 16, 1935 (hereafter referred to as *N & C*].

[7] N & C, January 26, 24, 1935.

[8] *N & C*, February 7, 1935.

[9] *N & C*, February 13, 14, 1935.

[10] *N & C*, April 17, 1935.

[11] *N & C*, April 25, 1935.

[12] *N & C*, May 13, 1935.

[13] *N & C*, May 15, 16, 1935.

[14] *N & C*, May 19, 1935.

[15] Interview with the Honorable Solomon P. Blatt, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Columbia, S. C., February 14, 1972. At the time of the controversy, Mr. Blatt was a major leader of the opposition forces in the House against Johnston's highway reorganization.

[16] *N & C*, June 7, 1935.

[17] *N & C*, August 23, 24, 25, 1935.

[18] *N & C*, September 5, 1935.

[19] *N & C*, September 19, 1935.

[20] *N & C*, October 19, 1935.

[21] Executive Order to Show Cause, sent to E. L. Culler, October 19, 1935. Johnston Papers, 1935 (Similar order sent to Hearon and Bethea).

[22] *N & C*, October 24, 25, 1935; Interview with Blatt, February 14, 1972; *N & C*, October 26, 1935.

[23] *N & C*, October 27, 1935.

[24] "An Address to the Citizens of South Carolina," delivered by Governor Olin Johnston, October 28, 1935. Johnston Papers, 1935.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Executive Order — Employment of Sufficient Force, issued by Governor Olin Johnston, October 28, 1935. Johnston Papers, 1935.

[27] Letters, from Olin Johnston to A. J. Beattie and E. P. Miller, October 28, 1935. *Ibid.*

[28] *N & C*, October 29, 1935.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Literary Digest*, November 9, 1935, p. 6.

[31] *N & C*, October 29, 1935.

[32] Letter from Olin Johnston to Major Frank Barnwell, October 29, 1935. Johnston Papers, 1935.

[33] *New York Times*, October 30, 1935; *N & C*, October 30, 1935.

[34] *N & C*, October 30, 1935.

[35] *New York Times*, October 31, 1935; *N & C*, October 31, 1935.

[36] *N & C*, November 2, 3, 1935.

[37] *N & C*, November 1, 1935.

[38] Brief prepared by Johnston's lawyers in response to Stabler's court order. Case was argued on November 11, 1935. Johnston Papers, 1935.

[39] *N & C*, November 19, 1935.

[40] *N & C*, November 14, 22, 1935.

[41] *N & C*, November 24, 26, 1935.

[42] *N & C*, December 6, 1935; *New York Times*, December 6, 1935.

[43] Executive Order of Suspension, from Governor Olin Johnston to E. L. Culler, J. C. Bethea, and C. O. Hearon, December 6, 1935. Johnston Papers, 1935.

[44] Executive Order of Suspension and Rule to Show Cause, from Governor Olin Johnston to Ben Sawyer and Highway Commissioners, December 6, 1935. *Ibid.*

[45] *N & C*, December 10, 1935.

[46] *N & C*, December 12, 13, 14, 1935.

[47] *N & C*, December 15, 1935.

[48] *N & C*, December 18, 1935.

[49] This information came from a partial transcript of the minutes of the December 20th conference, and appear to have been taken by one of the Governor's assistants. The record is very sketchy, and leaves out most of the important and heated discussion, simply annotating in parentheses that discussion occurred and giving a broad explanation. There were several misunderstandings between the two parties. The main legislative participants were Representatives Bennett and Poag and Senators Nash, Nance, and Williams with Nash playing the major role. The big argument centered around the definition of an impartial to run the department, the problem was resolved with the person defined as anyone not a commissioner, chief, unconfirmed appointee, or manager after October 28. Johnston Papers, 1935.

[50] *N & C*, December 21, 22, 1935.

[51] *N & C*, January 4, 1936.

[52] *N & C*, January 11, 12, 1936.

[53] *N & C*, January 16, 1936.

[54] *N & C*, January 17, 1936.

[55] *N & C*, January 19, 1936.

[56] *N & C*, February 8, 11, 1936.

[57] The bill provided for the legislative election of 14 commissioners from each of the judicial circuits for terms of two years with the chief also being legislatively elected. Interview with Solomon Blatt, February 14, 1972.

[58] *N & C*, February 15, 1936.

[59] *N & C*, February 19, 20, 21, 1936.
[60] The amended bill would elect the commission 30 days after adjudication of removal proceedings, *N & C*, February 22, 1936.
[61] The Senate version would allow the present commissioners to fill out their terms first before election by legislature. *N & C*, February 28, 1936.
[62] *N & C*, March 3, 10, 1936.
[63] *N & C*, April 11, 1936.
[64] *N & C*, April 14, 1936.
[65] *N & C*, April 15, 1936.
[66] *N & C*, April 22, 1936.
[67] *N & C*, April 26, 1936.
[68] *N & C*, April 30, 1936; Interview with Solomon Blatt, February 14, 1972.
[69] *N & C*, May 2, 1936.
[70] *N & C*, May 3, 1936.
[71] *N & C*, May 7, 1936.
[72] *N & C*, May 13, 1936.
[73] *N & C*, May 14, 1936.
[74] *N & C*, May 15, 1936.